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SUMMARY
This thesis considers cognitive narrative a component of intelligence that
specializes in generality. In exploring the ubiquitous external (mediated) and internal
(cognitive) functions of narrative it provides two contributions to the literature: a
uniquely cross-discipline survey of narratology that bridges humanities, social science,
and computational fields; and a theory to generate cognitive personal narratives from
ongoing perception. The implications of narrative cognition and cognitive narrative
are discussed as well as the limitations of this introductory theory and the grounds




The goal of this thesis is to provide two contributions to the fields of digital media
and narrative studies. The first is a broad survey of narrative scholarship that estab-
lishes narrative itself as essentially general and cross-disciplinary, and supports the
fundamental cognitive importance of narrative. This survey brings to bear theory
and direction that supports the second contribution: a theory of cognitive narrative
that extends psychological theories of perception and cognition. The theory pro-
posed recognizes narrative cognition as an essential human faculty and provides a
starting-place for models capable of capturing life-long narrative learning, experien-
tial narrative generation, and eventually capacities like narrative comprehension.
Despite advances in modern psychology and neuroscience the human mind remains
the most important undiscovered country. One certain fact, however, is the central-
ity of narrative to the human experience and our history, societies, religions, art, and
entertainment. In our daily personal experiences we consume stories ravenously and
produce them prodigiously; even when we aren’t answering social media’s plea to
share our stories our text messages, conversations, and thoughts themselves are spin-
ning a continual tapestry of narrativized meaning. Yet despite story rising alongside
language as one of the ubiquitous and definitively human powers of our species, re-
search into its cognitive roots and effects is an endeavor that has only recently begun.
Despite some qualities of youth as a science, narrative is in the unique position of
straddling the boundaries between disciplines of all kinds and brings to bear consider-
able insight from the literary and artistic fields even as brain studies and psychology
continue to delve into the neurological bases of storytelling and story understanding.
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As opposed to the formal study of narrative, mankind’s experience of narrative
dates to our earliest genesis. Despite the establishment of narrative into our very
nature, our experience of it is forced to adapt with the sophistication of life and the
technological development of the media that transport narrative to us (or transport us
in narrative). Modern storytelling transcends its oral origins and can work, verbally
and non-verbally, across the spectrum of perception; through games stories become
interactive on unprecedented levels; and as artificial intelligence (AI) promises to
interact with us in increasingly personal and interconnected ways it becomes ever
more important for us to explore both the ways we experience narrative and the ways
of sharing some degree of this human quality with the systems that interact with us.
In this work the goal has been to explore narrative with cognitive systems that
can simultaneously offer insight into human thinking and produce new ways of rea-
soning for AI agents. An ideal test bed for these early agents has been within the
space of video games. One value of using video games as a domain for this kind of
research is that they offer forgiving simulations with controlled degrees of complexity.
Nonetheless the system employed here has also been successfully used for complex
robots and military-grade AI applications, so that insights at the game level can look
forward to extension to more complex realities.
Another benefit of video games as a domain is the natural amalgamation of literary
and artistic creativity, both new and established, with technology. In this they parallel
narrative research itself. Even games as simple as Fruit Ninja are part of a culture
that admits ninjas, knights, dragons, and magic as they push forward for improved
technical innovations. Throughout this thesis a similarly holistic approach is taken.
Sections are ordered according to the overarching exploration of narrative itself with
interdisciplinary contributions considered each step of the way.
This work articulates a theory of narrative cognition that is considered through
the perspective of implementation in the Soar cognitive architecture. In particular,
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this work considers the episodic memory that is built from the life-long experiences of
the agent. For a human, memory for experiences is inextricably narrative in nature:
it is almost impossible to separate the memories from the stories we tell as we consider
and communicate them, and the details of the memories shift as much as does any told
and retold story. Human memory is fundamentally creative. This differs significantly
from computer memory, which is excellent at encoding rote facts in detail but does not
naturally lend itself to analogy, creativity, or sensible constraints of attention. While
human memory certainly begins as raw data from our perception, this subject of this
work is an AI that is able to narratively process that data to produce something that
seems more humanly episodic: memories of a form with a beginning, middle, and end,
upon which further components of narrative intelligence can be built. Put another
way, this work is an effort to confer to an AI an understanding of what narrative is,
and give it the first tools in how to use narrative in its thinking.
The theory for narrative cognition that is introduced here has a bearing on hu-
man’s life-long narrative capacities, and provides a starting point intended to be
similar to the human starting starting as children, where the young begin by making
narratives that seem simplistic or uninteresting to more experienced narrators, but
which establish the narrative base which is the foundation for more advanced narra-
tive cognition. Future work should be firstly concerned with the learning mechanisms
by which narrative cognition feeds itself and develops with experience. Other impor-
tant future work will crucially include narrative comprehension by which narratives
are generated from other than first-hand experience of events, and advances along
each of the lines of cognitive instrumentality laid out in section 2.3.
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 considers the nature and defini-
tion of narrative. First narrative is considered as an independent concept, as distinct
(or indistinct) from story. Concepts of the subject from literature and psychology
are considered in terms of the functional and practical implications of the differing
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concepts. Next situated concepts of narrative are considered, which regard narrative
within social and systemic contexts. Features particularly important to precise mod-
eling are considered. The chapter next considers the topic of narrative intelligence
and the cognitive activities that for which narrative can be applied. In particular,
story generation, story comprehension, and story telling are each considered. Inves-
tigations in this chapter are guided by the question, what difference does narrative
intelligence make?
Chapter 3 extends section 2.3 on cognitive narrative by considering psychological
and neural mechanisms. It first reviews the psychological apparata of episodic mem-
ory and the relationship between human episodic memory and narrative. The second
portion of the chapter introduces Event Segmentation Theory (EST) [56], upon which
this thesis’ theory of narrative cognition is based.
Chapter 4 starts with an introduction of cognitive architectures in general and
the Soar architecture in particular. It considers applications of Soar in digital media
applications. It concludes with the development of a theory of fundamental narrative
cognition built upon EST in Soar.
Chapter 5 concludes by taking stock of the theory from chapter 4 and consider-
ing its strengths, limitations, and future directions. The application of the work is




While even linguistic universals are challenged as experts explore the cultures of the
world, there has been found no exception to the universality of stories and story-
telling. Every culture and society across the world seems to use stories in one way or
another, and stories seem to be a key tool for humans to understand time and expe-
rience. Because of this prevalence, the subject of narrative has found its way into a
plethora of fields of study including psychological, literary, media, and computational
fields of research. This has the advantage of providing a rich variety of viewpoints and
perspectives upon the subject, but this advantage is double-edged. With the increas-
ing number of perspectives on the subject of narrative has come complication of what
narrative actually is. This complexity has had a prism-like effect upon the definition
of narrative, with each field constituting a lens that captures a different spectrum
of narrative. But, like a prism’s rainbow, these many perspectives on narrative offer
insights that contribute to the conversation on narrative across media.
In this chapter we take up an exploration into the nature of narrative, sampling
from a range of approaches. We begin with a brief discussion of terms, particularly of
reader. Section 2.2.1 reviews some of the central concerns of narrative theory, which
has long been occupied with the question of the structures that narrative can take. In
particular, narrative structuralism is considered not only in its original explication by
folklorists like Vladimir Propp and from theorists like Barthes and Genette, but also
in the work of modern computational theorists who consider these earlier approaches
foundational.
The structuralist analyses of narrative and of the experiences narrative fosters
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have developed into the field of cognitive narratology, discussed in section 2.3, which
considers the bread-and-butter conversational structure and role of narratives in day-
to-day life, as well as theories of the internal roles of narrative in the mind. This
chapter concludes with a consideration of the important similarities and distinctions
between cognitive narrative, intelligence for narrative, and narrative for intelligence.
The discussion of narrative intelligence foreshadows section 2.4, wherein the con-
nection of narrative with efforts in artificial intelligence is considered. AI approaches
narrative as something to be applied, either as a tool for intelligence or as an object
of intelligence. This notion extends beyond the field of the artificial to the every-day
human use of narrative for negotiating reality.
The chapter concludes with an overall summary and a highlight of particularly
relevant contributions to the theory of this thesis from the considered fields.
2.1 Coming to Terms with the Reader: A Note on Narra-
tive Recipients
Before we launch into a discussion of narrative as an object and of the effects of
narrative it is necessary to establish a standard term for the one whom that narrative
effects–the one who, if narrative is a conduit of meaning, is the recipient of that
meaning; or if narrative is a function, upon whom that function principally acts.
Viewpoints emphasizing the role of narration in the narrative have also sometimes
termed this person the narratee (as in sections of Barthes’ work [9]). Common ground
between the literary, rhetorical, and dramatic fields has been achieved with the term
audience [104], while the theatrical and movie circles also readily refer to viewers.
Narratives are often discussed in communication and marketing studies with reference
to story consumers [33], a term which is certainly general enough to apply across
disciplines but brings with it a context of commercial appetite that may not be desired.
And none of these are a particularly familiar fit for gamers, whose interactivity with
narratives is particularly highlighted by the term player.
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In this thesis the term reader has been chosen with reference to the primary
recipient(s) of narrative effect. While the action of reading may not at first seem to
be as applicable to non-literary or non-textual media, this term is useful for several
reasons. Firstly, it unites our terms with the standard across the bulk of narratology,
even extending to discussions of narrative kinds like Barthes’ readerly texts [9] (again,
not strictly referring to the literary). Secondly, reference to the action of reading
emphasizes the process of active sense-making; this interpretive action is one of the
core functions of narratives, both as mediated texts and in the mind, and will be
useful even as we discuss, somewhat less conventionally, readers of films and games.
This is not a completely foreign usage of the term since the metaphor of reading is
readily applied when we ask someone’s reading of a film or a situation. This term
prompts productive questions when considered with cognitive narrative (section 2.3),
a case in which the author and the reader might seem to be one and the same.
2.2 Narrative Structure
2.2.1 Dramatic- and Plot-structures
The search for the structure of narrative, singular or manifold, has guided the genesis
of narrative studies, and precedes efforts to generate, comprehend, or communicate
them. This interest dates to the earliest periods of literary criticism. Aristotle, ever
influential, offers us the concept of narrative consisting definitively of a beginning, a
middle, and an end [23]. While this simple concept of narrative fits with easy intuition
of the nature of narrative, its implications should not be overlooked. Such a clearly
delineated structure for narrative heralds a separation the substance of narratives
from the seamless experience of life; it’s unrealistic in some of the best ways. This
dynamic division between life and narrative will be further considered in section 2.3.
Even the simple tri-segmented definition can be considered a de facto standard until
the advents of modernism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism would develop to
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Figure 1: Freytag’s Pyramid of dramatic structure [39]
challenge this notion.
While the Aristotelian structure of narrative may seem overly simplistic for the
modern needs of many scholars, it is for this very simplicity that it has been valued
for so long by those who seek a platform to start from. The indelible magnitude
of Poetics impact upon critical thought for literature, drama, and other fields is at
the heart of much work by Classicists and is beyond the appropriate scope of this
thesis, but among its repercussions was the development of dramatic structures such
as Freytag’s Pyramid [39] (image 1), which augments Aristotle’s three-part structure
for drama with rising and falling patterns of action intensity. These concepts of struc-
ture conceive of narrative from a dramatic, rhetorical perspective. Here, narrative
is structured according to its effect upon the audience or narratees. The subject of
these paradigms is narrative to be consumed, largely for entertainment; as such, its
goal is structures which can be natively understood and comprehended with a little
barrier to entry as possible.
This dramatic approach to narrative, with its immediate appeal to the general
audience, focuses upon plot: the high-level sequence of the events that are crucial
to a narrative. So great is the human appetite for narratives that these sort of
plot-centric views have continued to bear fruit. The literary invention of the novel
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Figure 2: An example Plotto entry, indicating the gist of this segment of the story
and what segments could follow
produced a new way for consuming narratives and the nickel- and dime-novels of the
early 20th century profited from feeding this appetite in newer, faster ways. In this
context we see informal exploitations of a plot-centric view of narrative in works like
Cook’s Plotto: a new method of plot suggestion for writers of creative fiction [26]. In
this volume, and in those like it, the author offers resources for the would-be story-
generating author. Cook’s book undertakes to achieve creative art by what he calls
“plot suggestion,” by which story clauses are stitched together under the guidance
of, or to the emergence of, over-arching themes. Plotto explicates a basic algebra of
characters and agents, guiding the user through constructing a plot that need only
be fleshed out to become, presumably, a best-selling novel. A sample from Plotto can
be seen in figure 2.
Cook’s system is a predecessor to computational algorithms for narrative genera-
tion and demonstrates the plot-centric concept of narrative that is popular for enter-
tainment and mass-production. It shares with eventual computational approaches an
audience-centric view of narrative that is concerned primarily with productivity, as
opposed to theoretical descriptiveness or psychological appropriateness. These pro-
ductive, plot-centric approaches can provide insight into general narrative trends and
data for further analysis.
In addition to generative approaches that share with dramatic narrative an interest
in the general audience, a second significant contribution from the dramatic approach
to narrative stems from the work of Kenneth Burke, a rhetorician and literary the-
orist who developed the theory of dramatism, which applies directly Shakespeare’s
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Figure 3: Burke’s Dramatism Pentad [20], illustration from West & Turner [134]
metaphor that “All the worlds a stage, and all the men and women merely players”
[121] as a philosophy of human communication and relationships which has impacted
a wide range of fields [19, 21, 134]. Burke’s model situates agents within a scene
where acts are committed for the purposes of the agents, according to the agent’s
agency (the Dramatism Pentad, figure 3).
Burke’s paradigm was formalized into narrative terms by Walter Fisher, who devel-
oped Narrative Paradigm theory with the notion that all of human experience can be
considered a practice of story telling (structured according to the Aristotelian distinc-
tions of beginning, middle, and end) [36]. Fisher’s concept of narrative as primarily a
sequence of events allowed him to frame the paradigm as an all-encompassing theory
of more universal scope than literary approaches allow, somewhat in agreement with
cognitive (2.3) and computational (2.4) generalizations. The Narrative Paradigm is
further discussed in section 2.3, but of particular value from the theory is Fisher’s
definition of narrative rationality as centering upon fidelity and coherence; that
is, by the degree to which a narrative “rings true” with the experiences and values of
the receiver (fidelity) and the degree to which it is plausible and cohesive within the
reckoning of its own story world (coherence) [36, pp. 24-25, 156].
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2.2.2 Proppian Narrative Structure
Long before the advent of the novel mankind’s hunger for narrative caused the devel-
opment of folk tales. These are the object of the study of Vladimir Propp, a Russian
Structuralist of the early 20th century now considered one of the fathers of modern
narratology. Unlike dramatic perspectives on narrative, Propp removed audiences
and, to a degree, even drama from consideration; the narratives themselves, instan-
tiated in specific tales but forming a genre of Russian folklore altogether, were the
subject of Propp’s research. Meticulously analyzing dozens of folktales from a corpus
collected by Alexander Afanasiev, Propp eventually produced his landmark analysis,
Morphology of the Folktale [105]. From Propp’s work the field of narratology devel-
oped the ideas of a three-part structure of narrative, consisting of fabula, sjuzhet,
and text or media.
Where dramatic narrative structures derived from Aristotle’s three parts are con-
cerned with the external form of narratives as received by an audience, the narra-
tological structures developed from Propp’s work consider the structure of narrative
internal representation. In this way they share something in common with Chom-
skyian notions of sentence structure, which propose a deep structure of underlying
semantics and the surface structure of the actual words selected. Likewise Propp’s
fabula constitutes a deep structure containing all events taking place in the story,
whether communicated or implied. The fabula is considered to be ordered according
to the order of the events. The sjuzhet is then the order and content preparatory to
the actual telling of the story, which may omit items from the fabula and may order
them differently (as, for example in cinematic narratives, when a flashback reveals
episodes at a time other than their actual occurrence). Finally the sjuzhet is inter-
preted into whatever terms are appropriate to the given medium, resulting in the final
product media (called the “text” in traditional narratology [8]).
Propp’s three-part structure has become the standard of narratology. Starting
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with the fabula it offers a model that can capture the increasing complexity of a
narrative, beginning with only ordered events and progressing to eventually arrive
at the rich and ambiguous fullness of the text. Because of this clear developmental
path it has been possible to functionalize some degree of narrative development in
computational narrative generation. The fabula-sjuzhet-text process is well suited
to becoming the model for algorithms. As will be discussed in section 2.3, however,
the popularity of the three-fold narrative generation process for computers serves to
highlight the rift that can exist between computer and human intelligence.
Propp also provided another resource for narrative generation efforts. Aside from
the proposed internal structure of narratives, Propp focused up on the actions of
characters. Assigning characters to different classifications, he found that the Russian
folktales followed closely the same sequence of events throughout stories. Characters
of certain types, placed in certain situations, predictably performed the same actions
with little variation. He went to extensive lengths to codify these character-action
formulas and produced the predecessor of the story grammars of the 1980s [116].
As has been indicated, the structuralist narratology pioneered by Propp is char-
acterized by a simplicity and modularity that makes it and its descendants a useful
basis for modern computational approaches (section 2.4). In particular it has been
the direct basis of a number of narrative generation systems [34, 42] and a defining
theoretical basis of many more [6, 111, 74].
2.2.3 Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Narrative
2.2.3.1 Barthes
Literary approaches to narratology are not necessarily driven by the same concerns
for modularity and productivity as plot-based approaches. One of the landmark
works from the literary perspective is Barthes’ 1975 essay S/Z [9]. Meting out a deep
micro-analytic framework for how narratives construct meaning, Barthes’ approach
holds any minimalist plot-based approach to generalizing the structure of narrative
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Table 1: Barthes’ five codes of narrative meaning, collected from S/Z [9]
Code Explanation Example(s)
Hermeneutic Pertaining to questions and truth
“What is Terracing? A noun? A name?
A thing? A man? A woman?”
Seme Connotation; “the unit of the signifier” Femininity, Cold
Symbol Pertaining to rhetorical constructs or themes Antithesis, Wealth, Emptiness
Action Proairetic; events which have ends or results “I was deep in [a daydream]. . . ”
Reference References to a science or a body of knowledge
“. . . whose beauty embodied the fabled
imaginings of the Eastern poets!”
to be repugnant; instead, his focus is upon the experiencing of narratives as they
are attended. This approach is relevant not only to the reading of narratives, which
was Barthes’ central focus, but also to the watching, listening, and interacting with
narratives that are made possible by modern media.
Barthes’ proposes five codes present in narratives for the capturing of meaning
(figure 1). In so doing, he proposes not a structure for narrative itself, which he argues
should not be thought of as being constrained to a singular structure, but rather a
language that holds for the human experiencing of a formal narrative (as opposed to
the informal narratives of daily experience, discussed in 2.3).
By disregarding the notion of a static narrative structure and instead encouraging
focusing upon the interaction we have with narratives, Barthes’ pioneered an approach
that highlights the sophisticated capabilities of narrative and the language and sym-
bolism that narrative makes possible. His approach has contributed significantly to
later work on narratology including cognitive narratology (section 2.3). Each of his
five codes identifies aspects of narrative and narrative language that are built upon
by later theories.
The hermeneutic code identifies narrative’s capacity for defining a story-world
that holds its own internal structure, rules, and truth. Barthes described this code
as capturing “The various (formal) terms by which an enigma can be distinguished,
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suggested, formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed” [9, p 18]. A relation
to the dramatic models of narrative can be detected, with the rhetorical powers of
narrative being recognized by both. The quality of a narrative with respect to the
hermeneutic code can be judged as its internal coherence in the world and charac-
ters it maintains. The concept of internal coherence invited by consideration of the
hermeneutic code has become a come to be almost universally considered an essential
component of the quality of a narrative not only from a literary standpoint but also
from the psychological perspective [127, 81, 93] and the computational perspective
[112, 138, 102]. While Barthes was opposed to a generalized structure for narrative,
he succeeded in identifying a generalized quality.
The seme code is, by nature, an evanescent quality of narrative that Barthes de-
scribed as “flickers of meaning,” the atomic constituents that “combine with other
similar elements to create characters, ambiances, shapes, and symbols” and “the unit
of the signifier” [9, p 17]. They rely upon connotation for their meaning. The video
medium offers clear examples of this quality, which could be identified not only by
deconstructing the symbols (themes and tropes) it forms but also in the backgrounds
and subtle details that serve to flavor or emotionally locate the narrative. In partic-
ular, semes reflect connoted meaning that arises from context and collocation with
the seme itself. From a psychological perspective, semes are the most “bottom-up”
of the codes, the least structural of themselves. Generative approaches to narrative
largely overlook this element on its own because it operates by leveraging abstract
general knowledge to create subtleties of representation, or else to be composed into
the symbols that can be more easily managed and recognized.
Unlike the flickering semes, symbols are recognizable and discrete; to an extent,
categorizations like Propp’s are an indexing of symbols (and actions). Knowledge of
symbols is distinct from the sort of knowledge that the referential code draws upon;
rather than referring to properties of the world or to a body of facts, the symbolic
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code refers to themes and rhetorical mechanisms that operate at a more abstract
level in the narrative. Of particular interest to Barthes is the symbolic mechanism
of antithesis. S/Z analyzes Balzac’s short story Sarrasine in which Balzac makes
frequent and effective use of antithesis; for example, highlighted by Barthes in the
line,
Thus, on my right, the dark and silent image of death; on my left, the
seemly bacchanalias of life: here, cold nature, dull, in mourning; there,
human beings enjoying themselves.
– Sarrasine [29], analyzed by Barthes [9, pp. 25-26].
Antithesis is a particularly powerful example of the code of symbols that serves to
explore information about two concepts and the difference between them. As a sym-
bolic mechanism it can be used frequently and compellingly to deepen the impact of
a text and to centralize ideas in the flow of the narrative. This exemplifies the utility
of the symbolic code, which builds upon a repertoire of tools that can be re-used, and
hence serve as a more general language of narrative communication. These symbols
can form a “vast ... structure” that can reveal an “immense province” that taps
into the symbolic knowledge of the reader [9, pp. 17-18]. By nature, the symbolic
repertoire consists of narrative mechanisms that may readily translate across media;
for example, antithesis is as valid and poignant a mechanism in film as in literature.
The action code is familiar from the discussion of plot-based story structures,
and is one of the most easily grasped by readers. It is into terms of actions that
summaries and re-tellings of stories most easily arrange themselves. Barthes invokes
the Aristotelian term proairesis in the discussion of the action code, by which he
refers to the capability we have to perceive an action and immediately predict a
result of that action. As Barthes points out, narrative adds a dimension to this
proairesis by allowing predictions to be made based on narrative understanding that
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might not apply to other types of experience (or might apply, as will be discussed in
section 2.3); for example, if we know that in an action story the good guys always
win and therefore will not plummet to their death after dangling from the precipice.
Our proairetic ability is fundamental to the model of cognitive narrative that will be
considered in this thesis (section 3.3).
Barthes makes a point that his codes are in no particular order–they are, in fact,
just the order he finds them exhibited in Sarrasine–but the final code is the referential
or cultural, by which a text draws upon an established body of knowledge presumably
known to the reader. Like the symbolic code, this indicates narrative’s ability to
orient pre-existing knowledge to a story, complementary to the in-story knowledge
indicated by the hermeneutic code. However, this capacity has been both magnified
and blurred with internal storyworld knowledge with the advent of transmedia stories
and the encyclopedic affordances of digital media, as exhibited in online communities,
story wikis, and fandoms [91], which have exponential increased the intertextuality
that can be exhibited by narratives.
Barthes framework for analyzing the experience we negotiate with a narrative has
deeply impacted the critical literary and narrative fields. Although his stance against
narrative generalization is apparently contrary to the endeavors of computational
narrative approaches (particularly narrative generation) that will be considered in
section 2.4, Barthes viewed the text (the individual narrative object) as a system. In
this way we see a similarity between Barthes description of narrative and, as loathe
as Barthes might be to make such a comparison, a mathematical or programmatic
function (rather than a data structure) in which the reader is the input:
One does not narrate to ‘amuse,’ to ‘instruct,’ or to satisfy certain an-
thropological function of meaning; one narrates in order to obtain by ex-
changing; and it is this exchange that is represented in the narrative itself:
narrative is both product and production, merchandise and commerce, a
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stake and the bearer of that stake. [9, p. 88]
Barthes’ elements of narrative provide concepts that can be seen and are utilized,
directly or indirectly, throughout modern approaches to narrative and in even implicit
capacities in the theory of cognitive narrative of this thesis.
2.2.3.2 Genette
Eight years after Barthes’ pioneering S/Z came Genette’s Narrative Discourse: An
Essay in Method [40], a second pivotal work from the French school of narrative
that has had monumental impact upon narratology and conceptions of narrative
structure. Where Barthes approach emphasized narrative as an indissoluble trans-
formative function, Genette takes a much more structured (and somewhat playful)
approach that considers narrative from a level of abstraction higher than the word-by-
word analysis performed by Barthes. He produces a framework of lenses that capture
more general elements of narrative, which are cognizant of–and pressingly relevant
for–narrative as a practice and form across media (influencing, for example, critical
film theory [52]). Where Barthes focuses on word-level encodings, Gennette’s theory
complements Barthes’ by capturing broader strokes that hold over passages or whole
narratives.
Genette establishes three “ambiguities” of the word narrative that are sometimes
today as overlooked as they were at the time of his writing, and which form useful
distinctions and are cited in table 2.
It is particularly important to recognize these ambiguities of the term “narrative”
because of the interdisciplinary ubiquity of narratives, and that different disciplines
may readily employ different primary concepts. Although Barthes did not explicitly
recognize this ambiguity in S/Z, he and Genette share a focus upon definition 1–that
is, narrative as an object of discourse which, therefore, submits to textual analysis. In
respect for the ambiguity that overloads the term “narrative,” Genette distinguishes
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Table 2: Three meanings of “narrative” and Genette’s terms for them [40, pp. 25-26]
Term Description
Narrative
The narrative statement, the oral or written discourse that undertakes
to tell of an event or a series of events
Story
The succession of events, real or fictitious, that are the subject of
this discourse [from definition above], and to their several relations of
linking, opposition, repetition, etc
Narrating
The event that consists of someone recounting something: the act of
narrating taken in itself
between the three terms with narrative, story, and narrating, respectively.
Of particular importance is Genette’s distinction of story from narrative, in which
story represents an underlying content similar to Propp’s fabula. Genette’s definitions
of story and narrative have led to a divide in modern usage across fields, with literary
scholarship often adhering to Genette’s terms (e.g. Rimmon-Kenan [113]) while work
in computational and cognitive narrative either merge the notions of “story” and
“narrative,” using both of them to refer Genette’s second (fabula-like) definition while
giving less attention to either of Genette’s “narrative” or “narrating” concepts. To
some extent we can see in this a divide as to whether to adhere more closely to
Western or Russian concepts of narrative structure.
Genette produces a three-fold system for examining narrative. This system is con-
cerned with the relationships that hold between the narrative and story and between
the narrative and narration. For the former relationship he discusses the concepts of
tense and mood, while the concept of voice applies to both relationships.
To the point of narrative structure, tense is the most applicable. This receives
Genette’s lengthiest attention and highlights narrative’s fundamental concern with
the temporal and the sequential. Genette considers three dimensions in which narra-
tive concerns itself with temporality: the order of presentation, the duration in which
content is represented, and the frequency with which a narrative refers to elements
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of the story.
Order remains a center of discussion in matters of narrative, being perhaps the
most easily comprehended and manipulated. This is particularly applicable in the
modern narrative, as technology has made editing and restructuring unprecedentedly
simple for virtually every form of storytelling from the literary to the visual. Indeed,
Genette recognizes the inherently more static nature of natural language as a medium,
pointing out that movie frames or comic strip panels can be literally presented in
reverse for differences of effect while the constraints of language do not allow for such
low-level re-sequencing while retaining comprehensibility [40, pp. 33-34]. Perhaps one
of the most widely-known explorations in narrative reordering is Christopher Nolan’s
2000 film Memento [99], in which the story is revealed in reverse and concepts of time
and perspective receive magnified importance [52, pp. 227-229]. Such explorations
in narrative ordering, joining the proairetic human capacity discussed by Barthes
(section 2.2.3.1), have highlighted a property of narrative that is now central to even
the most minimal definitions of narrative: that of causality [128, 112]. In the very
least it is the necessity for perceivable causality that distinguishes between a grocery
list and the sparsest story or narrative.
Genette’s topic of duration is prescient of the developments of digital media in-
somuch as it is perhaps more clearly visible in non-textual domains. More famil-
iarly characterized as rhythm, this element highlights the distinction between Plato’s
mimesis (exactly reproduced) and diegesis (purely narrative): narratives are rarely
composed of entirely word-for-word quotations of dialog (or, for example, single-shot
movies), and most significantly, the degree to which a passage of a narrative encap-
sulates more nearly a second or a year can and should be variable during the course
of the narration. While presently difficult to manipulate with any deliberate facility
in computational approaches to narrative, variation of narrative rhythm is an innate
quality of our mental narrative representations as well (section 2.3).
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The concept of frequency concludes Genette’s discussion of narrative tense by
complementing the concept of duration, how the narrative represents time, with that
of how many times the narrative refers to events. While this has long been a consid-
eration in textual analysis (for example Hebrew semantic repetition for parallelism
and verbatim repetition for superlatives, both abundantly evident in the Old Tes-
tament/Tanukh [77]), it is also frequently displayed in modern visual genres like
Japanese Anime and video games, which may replay a scene multiple times in quick
succession for dramatic effect. Genette also calls our attention to the less-used prop-
erty of frequency as exploited in the reverse: rather than multiple replays of the same
instance, at one time referring to multiple events. Perhaps more difficult to apply in
non-textual media, we see examples of this usage in references to “each night,” or
“all week” [40, p. 116] where we understand the phrase to provide information about
a range of similar events.
Genette’s discussion of mood draws us slightly away from considerations of nar-
rative structure and the internal relation of narrative to story, and toward his third
definition, the act of narration (figure 2). With this is highlighted the person and
activity of the narrator, a dimension that often goes undiscussed in non-literary the-
ories of narrative. Mood is concerned with what information is made available to
the consumer of the narrative, and inversely, what information is withheld. Perhaps
the most significant product of Genette’s analysis of mood is the idea of focalization,
which has been heavily drawn upon in narratology [8]. Genette’s use of the term
focalization is meant to capture each of the relationships of the narrator knowing
more than the [lead] character, the narrator knowing as much as the character (in
1st-person narratives, actually being that character), and the narrator knowing less
than the character (a common dramatic technique in theater or detective stories, for
example). Importantly, focalization can and often is altered in the course of a narra-
tive, and narratives can cycle through a closed cast of focalizers or can have a wide,
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oft-changing focalization. This concept is not insignificant to cognitive narrative, as
is particularly evident when we express reflection with phrases like, “If I knew then
what I know now,” or inversely “I didn’t know it at the time...” Focalization also
bears on the psychological theory of mind by which we simulate the thoughts of others
in our daily lives [44] (see section 2.3).
Genette concludes his essay with consideration of narrative voice. If mood is
concerned with information available to the reader of the narrative, voice is concerned
with the qualities of what is produced by the narrator and, in particular, the narrator’s
relation to the narrative. We might summarize it as concern with what, where, and by
whom narration occurs. In particular are considered the time of narrating relative to
the narrator (an inversion of the temporal concerns of ordering, previously discussed.
Subsequent, the most ubiquitous form; prior, or predictive, such as biblical prophesy;
simultaneous, such as a news cast or epistolary novels; and interpolated, in which
the relation goes back and forth between these), narrative level (admitting nested
narratives, such as Scheherazade’s telling of stories within stories within the story of
Arabian Nights [22]), and person (the relation of the narrator to the narration, such
as Scheherazade’s life depending upon her telling). While we have strong empirical
expectations about normal or default narratives (for example, un-nested past-tense
narratives from an omniscient/reliable narrator), the capacity for narrative to exhibit
other voices is an important feature of narrative capacity. Non-standard narrative
voices have been effectively employed in games such as the online Depict1, a side-
scroller in which the directions of a narrator are almost always lies and often lead
to the player’s death [89], and The Stanley Parable [24], an interactive narrative
in which the player navigates to ongoing narration that he may sometimes choose to
disobey, aggravating the narrator. With respect to narrative cognition, narrative voice
is of most clear importance in the task of comprehending narratives and rhetorical
situations as negotiated with others.
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2.2.4 Summary
We have considered the question of the structure and nature of narrative from the
literary and dramatic disciplines and have sampled a small portion of the theoret-
ical concepts that these fields have produced. From the dramatic fields we receive
structures exhibiting pragmatic modularity, which is well-suited for narrative gener-
ation, and philosophical paradigms establishing groundwork for work in natural and
cognitive narrative.
Western literary theorists have made inextricable contributions to modern con-
cepts of narrative across media. The micro-analytics of Barthes provide a framework
for analyzing the atomic details of a narrative object, with emphasis upon the effect
of a narrative upon the reader. Genette’s higher-level approach provides notions of
narrative are generalizable and important to modern narrative forms, speaking to
properties of narrative that are largely independent of the media in which a narrative
is embodied.
The structural emphasis on cohesion, Genette’s work on mood, voice, and narrative-
narratee relations, and the drama- and plot-centered approaches to narrative each
lend support to a notion of narrative quality that can be seen as sharing a measure
with Fisher’s narrative rationality, centering on validity to the receiver and internal
coherence.
2.3 Cognitive Narrative and Natural Narrative
The structuralist narratology that has been considered previously is concerned with
narrative universals and is concerned with narrative as an object or as a category
of objects that can be rigorously analyzed. This approach is a natural extension of
critical thought from literary, dramatic, and film fields, which take as the primary
objects of their study exemplars developed by (usually) non-scholar authors, produc-
ers, directors, and playwrights. Marie-Laure Ryan observes the dispersion that has
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occurred to broaden the critical relevance of narrative, pointing out that in recent
years “the narrative turn in the humanities gave way to the narrative turn everywhere
(politics, science studies, law, medicine, and last, but not least, cognitive science)”
[117]. This turn has led to two major theoretical responses to the breadth of narrative
relevance articulated by Ryan: the study of narrative across differing media and the
study of narrative as a cognitive thing transcending, or possessing a more fundamen-
tal nature, than its mediated forms. The distinction between these two approaches
echoes the distinction between Genette’s narrative or storytelling, which implies me-
diation, and story, which refers to the underlying structure which is eventually filtered
and transformed into a told narrative. However, it is important that this distinction
between the story and the storytelling not be dogmatized; particularly in the realm of
cognition the distinction between story comprehension and story generation–that is,
the difference between a story being crafted outside or within one’s mind–is a blurry
one.
There is an important distinction between the cognitive narrative discussed in
this section and the contents of chapter 3, which is concerned with certain psycholog-
ical mechanisms that have purposes including support for cognitive narrative. The
contents of this section remain centered upon narrative itself, considering the mind
through a narrative lens. In undertaking this discussion it is useful to draw a dis-
tinction between natural narrative and formal narrative, analogous to the distinction
between natural languages (those learned by children and spoken by humans) and
formal languages (those composed, such as computer programming languages). For-
mal narratives are the object of the afore-mentioned critical approaches that focus
upon analysis of (published) artefacts. Natural narratives are the central concern of
this thesis and bear the closest relationship to unmediated (cognitive) narratives. In
handling these increasingly dynamic notions of narrative new ways of defining the
subject–or avoiding defining–have been developed.
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2.3.1 Cognitivist Approaches
In Towards a Definition of Narrative [117] Ryan summarizes definitions of narrative
from a variety of scholars and disciplinary backgrounds. Among the more recent
trends in narrative theory is that of cognitive narrative, which views stories as a
cognitive structure that transcends the particulars of semiotics and mediated texts.
One of most influential voices on the subject is that of Jerome Bruner, who argues
for narrative as a key tool by which humans create reality [17]. He lays out a set
of ten narrative features which, though similar to catalogs of traditional features
from narratology previously discussed (i.e. with Barthes and Genette), is concerned
not with “how narrative as text is constructed, but rather how it operates as an
instrument of mind in the construction of reality.” In spirit Bruner’s approach is akin
to Schank and Abelson’s work on cognitive systems in which stories and narrative
structures such as scripts are regarded as fundamental mechanisms of thought [120].
Two of Bruner’s narrative features are particularly relevant to us.
One of Bruner’s most significant observations on the features of narrative cognition
is made by highlighting the function of canonicity and breach. In contrast with Schank
and Abelson’s scripts, Bruner argues that narrative centrally comprises breaches of
expectation while, naturally, maintaining an reckoning of the expectations themselves.
In Bruner’s approach, the boring are not narratives at all, and any narrative will
feature breach.
A second and related feature from Bruner’s list is normativeness, which is the
concern by which expectations are maintained. Herman extends the maintenance of
norms by taking the creation of norms as a key function of narrative cognition [47]:
a culture’s remembered and re-told stories help to establish the societal norms by
which social acceptability is reckoned. Bruner applies this function of narrative as
an inherent concern with episteme or knowledge of truth; reiterating Burke’s drama-
tism, Bruner suggests that cognitive narrative fundamentally deals with suspense and
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uncertainty.
Ryan points out that Bruner’s approach to cognitive narrative applies only to
narratives for entertainment, failing to recognize narratives of news, history, or daily
conversation. Scholars such as Brewer (“Stories are to entertain” [16]) were arguing
this case decades before Bruner’s elaboration of narrative reality, proposing an affec-
tive framework for understanding narrative; but these notions are incompatible with
cognitivist approaches to narrative that regard narrative as being a central constituent
of human thought, which after all concerns much more than entertainment.
Ryan makes a more serious criticism of cognitive narrative. She rightly points
out that over-eager appeals to the mental omnipresence of narrative run the risk of
conflating narrative with thought itself. A similar argument is made at length by
Galen Strawson [123] and other objectors, who particularly object to narrativity as
a core constituent of personal identity (an debate which has raged [18, 123, 32]).
It is clear that any serious approach to cognitive narrative needs to deal with the
boundaries and limitations of narrative as either distinct from or synonymous with
other faculties of cognition.
2.3.2 Narrativity
The move toward cognitivist approaches to narrative is a natural evolution from semi-
otic approaches like those of Barthes and the life-as-narrative paradigms of dramatic
descent, like Fisher’s narrative paradigm. As focus has shifted to phenomenological
concerns scholars have departed from binary definitions of narrative or static ideas
of narrative structure. The idea of narrativity was early articulated by Marie-Laure
Ryan [117] and set a trend for thought on narrativity as a graded quality, rather than
a simple yes-no value. According to Ryan’s rubric, narrative fluctuates to differing
degrees of adherence to requirements in four dimensions (table 3). The goal of these
dimensions, which owe clear inspiration to Genette’s characterizations of narrative
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Table 3: Ryan’s ”fuzzy-set” dimensions of narrativity [117]
Spatial 1
Narrative must be about a world populated by individuated
existents.
Temporal 2
This world must be situated in time and undergo significant
transformations.
3
The transformations must be caused by non-habitual phys-
ical events.
Mental 4
Some of the participants in the events must be intelligent
agents who have a mental life and react emotionally to the
states of the world.
5
Some of the events must be purposeful actions by these
agents.
Formal and Pragmatic 6
The sequence of events must form a unified causal chain and
lead to closure.
7
The occurrence of at least some of the events must be as-
serted as fact for the story world.
8
The story must communicate something meaningful by these
agents.
qualities, stands in contrast to structuralist approaches and aims to provide users
with a means for generating their own definitions of narrative according to which
dimensions or requirements they deem to be of most import for their work.
Ryan follows her outlaying of these dimensions with a careful enumeration of the
text-types that can be excluded as typical narratives by application of these rules;
for example, condition 1 can be adhered to in order to eliminate from a definition
of narrative general abstractions or stories about the human race, the universe, the
brain, etc; or condition 6 can be prioritized to eliminate hyper-realistic descriptions,
the majority of raw security tape footage, or ongoing diaries or logs. Ryan’s intention
is to provide a tool-kit for creation of definitions of narrative; whether or not a
scholar chooses strict adherence to Ryan’s eight narrative dimensions, the principle
of providing and defining dimensions of narrativity is particularly useful as narratives




In this thesis the term “natural narrative” has been chosen by analogy to the lin-
guistic ideas of natural and formal languages, emphasizing the cognitive and human
basis of narrative that is our concern; it is also precedented by Fludernik’s Towards
a Natural Narratology [37]. In other literature natural narrative is referred to as
personal narrative, conversational narrative, or, as in the title of Ochs’ and Capps’
book, Living Narrative [100]. With all of these terms the subject is narrative that is
informal, emergent, and negotiated or discursive.
Natural narrative stands apart from the carefully crafted narratives generally con-
sidered by the traditional critical arts. To some degree natural narratives are the em-
bodied expression of ideas from the cognitive approach; the storytelling of everyday
activity is a vivid witness of the functionality of narratives in our daily lives, as well
as of the uses to which we put narrative.
The inaugural study of what we are here calling natural narratives was conducted
by Labov and Waletzky [57] and is oft cited in the closely-related discourse analysis
literature. In their studies Labov and Waletzky interviewed citizens and gathered
their personal narratives, forming the basis for much future work in discourse anal-
ysis, linguistics, and narratology. Labov’s work set a precedent for later work of
scholars like Monica Fludernik who considered the study of narratives in their natu-
ral, personal, lived state to be fundamental to an understanding of more sophisticated
narratives that are the subject of literary analysis. Labov’s work has been influential
for the development of narrative interview methodologies as well as for the formal
analysis of recorded oral narratives [101].
Fludernik’s work has been oriented around the concept of natural or personal
narrative as a “prototypical form of narrative” [37, 38]. Ochs and Capps illustrated
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this idea with an analogy from archaeology:
We are reminded of the work of Nicholas Toth, who revolutionized the
understanding of Stone Age tools. Prior to Toth’s studies, the received
perspective was that early hominids chipped a cobble in such a way that
it could be used as a pick or hand ax. Researchers considered the splin-
tered flakes as waste products and examined them for information about
techniques used to shape the stone core tool. While others were ana-
lyzing the morphological shapes and cognitive correlates of the chipped
cores, Toth, in a radical turnabout, discovered that the flakes were the
primary tools and that the large stone was an incidental by-product, pos-
sibly a secondary tool. The flakes turned out to be ”extremely effective
cutting tools” for animals, wood, hides, and other work. . . . we posit that
like stone flakes, mundane conversational narratives of personal experi-
ence constitute the prototype of narrative activity rather than the flawed
byproduct of more artful and planned narrative discourse. [100, p. 3]
These notions of the essentiality of natural narrative are supported by literary philoso-
pher Mikhail Bakhtin, who argued that “the true essence of a text always develops
on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects” [7, p. 106]. One impact
of these ideas, which has effected both cognitive and literary approaches to narrative
has been the idea of development within narrative. From an artefact-analytic per-
spective this has led to the idea of narrativity, by which the question is no longer
the categorization of something as being a narrative or not (a favorite endeavor of
modernism), but the understanding of artifacts as falling on a gradient of more or
less narrativity, a structure that is more useful to ideas of narrative as a cognitive
object than the former dichotomy. The assessed narrativity, in turn, can express the
degree to which narrative cognitive functions suited to application of or upon a given
text (natural or artificial).
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A second concept pointed out by natural narrative and Bakhtin’s argument is the
developmental or emergent nature of narrative–that both individual narratives and
narrative as a tool of the mind develop over time. Ochs and Capps explore these two
developments in parallel, considering the development of narrative abilities within
young children as well as the discursive development of narratives for moralizing and
sense-making [100, 125].
2.3.4 Narrative Intelligence & Instrumentality
We use narrative as a tool with which we make sense of and negotiate reality, as
has been discussed with natural narrative. While the heritage of studies by Labov,
Fludernik, and others utilize methods of discourse analysis and analyze recordings and
transcripts of told stories, these stories also reveal key characteristics of the mind. In
the context of oral cultures and the formal oral narratives produced by them, David
Rubin has rigorously considered the mnemonic structures used to remember sizable
ballads, stories, and epic poems [115]. For many of these cultures, storytelling is a
crucial form of their traditions, education, and, to the gratification of arguments like
Bruner’s, their world-making practices. There is promising further research to be
done from a cognitivist approach to the features of formal yet non-literary narratives,
which look to be a middle-ground between the strata of natural and traditionally
considered formal narratives.
Some of the cultures considered by Rubin could be excellent candidates for further
research into cognitive narrative functions unclouded by the prevalence of modern
first-world broadcast/streaming media. In particular a set of cognitive functions of
narrative have been proposed by literary/cognitive narratology David Herman, who
describes five problem-solving functions that narratives fill in the human mind [47, 50],
visible in table 4.
Activity 1 from Herman’s listing involves world sense-making, which Herman has
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Table 4: Herman’s five problem-solving activities supported by narrative [47]
1 “Chunking” experience into workable segments
2 Imputing causal relations between events
3 Managing problems with the “typification” of phenomena
4 Sequencing behaviors
5 Distributing intelligence across groups
elsewhere considered at significant length [48] and which may need to occur before the
other supporting activities are achieved. Like Bruner’s concept of narrative reality-
making, Herman observes the way in which narrative structures (similar to Minsky’s
frames from cognitive science/AI [88]) are used to divide the stream of experience
into segments that are “bounded, classifiable, and thus more readily recognized and
remembered.” This capability is called by Mateas and Sengers narrative intelli-
gence [84], the ability to consider experience in narrative terms. The development
of an experiential story-base provides the foundational resources necessary for use
by the other functions and by advanced forms of narrative cognition, even before
children have the experience or capacity to exhibit more advanced forms of narrative
cognition or storytelling ability (see [100, ch. 2]).
The second supporting function of narrative is likewise important to learning.
Despite the statistical truism that correlation does not imply causation, imputing
before-and-after causative effects is a crucial developmental heuristic for us, and a
key (if sometimes fallible) mechanism in learning. The fundamentally sequential
ordering of natural narratives and experience means that narrative exploits and relies
upon cause-and-effect logic; inversely, insomuch as graded narrativity is admitted,
sequences without recognizable cause-and-effect demonstrate less narrativity and are,
ostensibly, less cognitively salient.
Activity 3 from Herman’s list, concerning typification, is similar to Bruner’s point
about narratives being concerned with norms [17]. Herman observes that in essence
we use narratives to structure the daily experiences of life and manage our attention by
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defining what’s normal and what’s surprising. It is worth noting that this occurs at a
range of different scales, from moment-to-moment activities to general behaviors, any
of which can be associated with narratives that provide predictive power. Herman
also points out that stories can be told preceding or without actual breaches, in
which case they can either make visible distinct differences in situations or provide a
comparison for breaches of expectation by which problem-solving tools like analogy
might be brought to bear.
Activity 4 refers to more than the major cognitive function of planning, which
is well developed in AI and cognitive science [137]. Herman points out two distinct
means by which storytelling supports sequencing. The first is as a social tool by which
turn-taking behavior is relegated in direct communication. On any of the scales be-
tween the story teller’s “taking of the floor” (consider in connection with the dramatist
perspective on people as actors, section 2.2.1) to the back-and-forth of conversational
story-making, narrative has traditionally and naturally made heavy use of turn-taking
and sequencing. On the other hand, the structure of narratives themselves and the
means by which narratives express story worlds reflect a sequence-sensitive nature, as
is a running theme through Genette’s analysis of narrative structure (section 2.2.3.2).
This structure may not be naturally occurring in some aspects of the world, partic-
ularly as we are involved in increasingly abstract social or temporal realities, and in
such cases narrative can support orientation and management of abstract levels of
experience.
Finally, Herman’s fifth item emphasizes the social nature shared by both narrative
and intelligence. Invoking the concept of distributed cognition by which intelligence is
increased by cooperative diffusion, Herman argues that narrative is “at once a vehicle
for and target of such distributed cognition.” This can be taken in connection with
Mar and Oatley’s strong assertion that “the function of fiction is the abstraction and
simulation of social experience” [81] to highlight the role of narrative as a necessary
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tool for effective sociality.
Taken together Herman’s five functions of narrative cognition can be seen as tar-
gets of aspiration for cognitive systems. The promise of such capacities would be
significant reward for AI developers, while the mechanisms and improvement of these
abilities are of interest to cognitive scientists. Finally, designers of narrative experi-
ences can also be well served by building to the narrative capacities of their audiences.
2.4 Computational Narrative
Computational approaches to narrative have opened new paths of study along with
new types of stories and new methods of storytelling. In general most of the ap-
proaches in computational narrative can be considered as falling into one of two
major categories: those oriented around narrative comprehension, including sum-
marization and learning systems; and those oriented around narrative generation,
including story-writing systems and interactive game systems. The computational
approach to narrative serves the function of bridging traditional humanities and so-
cial narrative studies with artificial intelligence, which also adds supporting resources
for cognitive narrative research. In both cases computational narrative has bene-
fited from narratological theory, particularly structuralist approaches which tend to
provide computationally friendly formalisms.
Both narrative comprehension and generation possess a similarity from functional
perspectives: they both produce narratives. A distinction is in what they take as
input: comprehension systems take narratives as input, while generation systems may
take narrative fragments, plans, action libraries, or other non-narrative components.
2.4.1 Narrative Comprehension
Although homage has been paid to the foundational nature of Propp’s contribu-
tions to computational work on narrative, much of computer science’s first work on
narrative was brought about by motivations apart from the contributions of Propp,
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arriving instead from a path in computational linguistics. Realizing that any compe-
tent language-using computer would need far more than grammatical understanding,
but in actuality a capacity for semantic context and general knowledge, computer
scientists and cognitive theorists brought their attention to narrative. One of their
foremost contributions to the thought on cognition and narrative was the articulation
of Schank and Abelson’s concept of scripts [120] and concern for knowledge structures
that could either derive from or parse narratives [15, 14].
In many ways scripts resemble the plots emphasized by dramatic approaches,
constituting an abstracted, ordered list of actions or events. In principle a script
represents a generalized sequence of “usual” events for a given scenario, such as going
to a movie or eating at a restaurant. Work on generating scripts by parsing stories has
been done by Li [73, 74, 72], who used Amazon Mechanical Turk [55] to crowdsource
knowledge of typical stories, such as bank robbery or going to a movie, and then
performed natural language processing over the crowd-provided results to generate
plot graphs from the data.
Provided knowledge of scripts, another key facility is the recognition of scripts that
are taking place–not only deciding upon a script for generation purposes, but situating
the self within an ongoing script. Such functions as this begin to move beyond any
audience-centricity of dramatic approaches to narrative and are concerned more with
application of narrative for intelligence, a process with promise for computers and
evidence as a human capability.
Another major application of story comprehension systems has been summariza-
tion [70]. This is applied to news stories, for instance [28], where the goal is to bring
to users a concise compilation of long or ongoing stories and to help information
analysts cope with an increasing flood of global event information. An summary of
recent work in this area is from Van Erp, Fokkens, and Vossen [133], who outline
guidelines for approaching the multi-genre content of news stories and suggest that
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strainers (higher-level abstractions of narratives) are “the most compact and informa-
tive structures for representing the essence of large volumes of news data over longer
periods of time.”
Narrative comprehension represents one of the most important areas for future
work in cognitive narrative insomuch as it would facilitate the core narrative function
of communication, as pointed out in Herman’s fifth item of story instrumentality
(table 4) on communication and distributed intelligence. It is also a key faculty for
learning and improvement of cognitive narrative.
2.4.2 Narrative Generation
In addition to scripts Schank and Abelson’s also brought to the discussion the con-
cepts of plans and goals, which have been found to lend themselves well as tools for
computational narrative generation. Both of these concepts are fundamentally based
upon the idea of states : factual (often mathematical) descriptions of a situation at
a given time. A state could represent almost anything; in a game of chess, each po-
sition of the board before or after a move is a state. In a narrative, each situation
or scene can be a state. A goal is some property or set of properties that is desired
in the states (e.g. Romeo being married to Juliet); a plan consists of states threaded
together from beginning until goal, joined by actions or events that transition one
state into the next. While Schank and Abelson may never have achieved their de-
sired height of general intelligence in a computer system, planning has become an
enormously successful field of research in its own right.
Researchers have found plans to be convenient forms to represent fabulas, which
can then be derived into sjuzhet and text expression. This trifold approach to narra-
tive generation has led to one of the leading schools of thought in narrative generation
(with a broad summary available in [110]). Using this approach researchers such as
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Mark Riedl have cast the story generation problem as one of balancing character be-
lievability and plot coherence [112], a point echoing the driving tension observed in
natural narrative by Ochs and Capps “between narrators’ yearning for coherence of
life experience and their yearning for authenticity” [100, p. 24].
One of the earliest story generation systems is Tale Spin (1977, [86]), which pre-
ceded modern planning formalisms but considered narrative generation as a process
of problem solving, generating tales of woodland creatures based on goal achieve-
ment. Universe (1983, [68])chose soap opera dialog/script generation as its genre,
and placed explicit emphasis on relatively complex character representation; it pro-
duced plot lines with no concrete ending (stories that could continue indefinitely).
Minstrel (1993, [131]) told moralistic stories about King Arthur and the knights of
Camelot; it used goals and plans to generate a story that satisfied author-level goals.
The Oz Project [76, 11, 75, 83] was an ongoing effort that approached story genera-
tion as primarily a process of character simulation, again using a form of planning;
because independent agents would act in discord without generating a recognizable
story, a drama manager was created to give over-arching guidance. The use of a
guiding drama manager has been used in a number of systems since then.
Useful, deeper surveys of narrative generation approaches are available in the work
of Riedl [112], Harrell [46], and most recently Gervás [41].
As video games have grown in popularity there is a keen interest in story generation
systems that can react to the activities of the players or lessen the need for hand-
crafted narratives in worlds that might include hundreds of thousands of players
(Massive Multiplayer Online games such as World of Warcraft). While work is still
too young to introduce systems that can satisfyingly scale to the level of MMORPG
games, this is a burgeoning field of research. Two interactive narrative systems will be
considered as examples. Facade [85] is a game which, through careful and costly hand-
crafting, produces rich and nuanced variations on a narrative that affords constrained
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agency to the player; and Haunt 2 [78] utilizes an Interactive Drama Architecture
[79] to maximize player agency while generating simpler, but still complete, stories.
Mateas and Stern’s Facade labels itself as an interactive narrative, rather than
a game, and sets the reader within a dinner party with a couple which, as dialog
continues and play unfolds, is seen to be on the verge of divorce. Players interact
via typed dialog and the game generates goals for the virtual characters that take
into account the player input. A planner was used to generate the activities of the
couple, with “beats” used to measure a small snippet of dialog that constitutes the
verbal actions by which a plan is executed. Ultimately the player either witnesses the
ending of the couple’s relationship or sees it repaired.
Facade produces rich, nuanced stories, but at the expense of carefully scripting.
Because of its reliance on hand-written material there was a lower-bound limit to the
range of unique plot-lines that could be generated by distinct player actions. Bal-
ancing hand-authored content with player agency and generative freedom is a major
point of oscillation in interactive story generation systems. An example from the op-
posite side of the spectrum is Magerko and Laird’s Interactive Drama Architecture,
showcased in Haunt 2. Built on the Unreal game engine and the Soar cognitive ar-
chitecture, Haunt 2 was designed to allow players a maximum of freedom while still
producing complete stories. It did this by taking an author-generated story which
is issued to the AI story director, which orchestrates the activities of the non-player
characters in the game and performs prediction upon player activities to assess en-
dangerment of the plot, adapting the world if necessary to keep the plot on-track.
The story itself is set within a bed and breakfast in which the player haunts the site as
the ghost of a murder victim, aiming to discover who the murderer is and interacting
with the world, and invisibly with characters in the world, to solve the crime.
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2.4.3 Summary
Work in computational narrative on narrative comprehension methods is similar in
spirit to analytic approaches from the humanities, and as a knowledge-engineering
and machine-learning endeavor has a relationship to cognitive approaches to narra-
tive as well. Work on narrative generation is burgeoning now with interest from video
game and entertainment industries and is more distinctly influenced by pragmatic ap-
proaches in structuralism and production-oriented dramatic approaches. Narrative
generation also reshapes story telling to employ the affordances of digital media, al-
though many current systems seem primarily focused upon generation of story struc-
ture rather than a surface-form text (media).
The theory for cognitive narrative introduced in chapter 4 has similarity to simulation-
based approaches to narrative generation (including the emphasis on simulated char-
acters in Haunt 2 ). Though current narrative generation approaches do not tend
to consider narrative from a cognitivist perspective, the story-understanding of the
comprehension work and the mechanisms of the generation work are both of use to
research in cognitive narrative in theory and in AI.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has considered a broad variety of approaches in narrative, but the survey
is far from exhaustive. A complete survey within any single one of the highlighted
fields would require volumes, if it were possible at all, and with continual advances in
media, technology, and narrative theory, any exhaustive approach would be rapidly
out-moded. This survey is, however, one of unusual breadth in considering the range
of fields that it has, a fact that is complemented by the elaboration of certain psycho-
logical literature in support of narrative theories in chapter 3. The fields that have
been considered in this chapter each provide valuable insights.
The dramatic approaches to narrative elaborate some of the roots of narrative
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study, revealing an original closeness between narrative and human life and activ-
ity that is sometimes distanced in the complex literary narratives that later seized
narrative studies. However, dramatic approaches have continued alive and well, and
have produced, besides their original contributions on narrative structure, narrative
philosophies for society and personal life. Of particular value is Fisher’s definition
of narrative rationality, which generalizes a means of narrative evaluation that is
relevant to cognitive narrative and natural narrative.
The broadest and deepest research into narrative stems from the literary arts,
from whence the field of narratology itself originates. Literary scholars, critics, and
philosophers have delved deeply into the study of narrative objects and have produced
a wealth of insights. The choice to focus on Barthes and Genette here, both of whom
constrained their principal studies to a narrow selection of narratives, was made due to
the foundational nature of their approaches to narratology, with later work proceeding
largely in genesis from the work of these two. Barthes particularly considers the
surface, semiotic and meaning-making level of narrative, occupied at the level of
what Genette would call the narrative and narrating levels. Barthes work highlights
the phenomenology of narrative, a principle of pertinence to cognitive narrative and
the theory of narrative cognition we will lay out. Genette’s work, conversely, focused
on the structure of narrative in general and laid groundwork for later structural
analysis and support for Propp’s related structural approaches. Genette’s work on
the structure of narrative does indeed generalize nicely to a breadth of the narrative
spectrum, as is evidenced by its use as the basis of narrative structuralism.
Cognitive narrative is the central concern of this thesis and owes its heritage to
both the literary and the dramatic perspectives. Central to this thesis is the concept
of natural narrative, the stories we use for reality-making and identity-making. The
theory of cognitive narrative brings to bear the centrality of the human condition
to narrative by definition, and inversely, the centrality of narrative to the human
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experience. It also suggests an origin for narrative distinct from the historical origin
for narrative studies from the dramatic arts: narrative can be considered as origi-
nally, fundamentally, a cognitive thing. With this vantage it can be seen that the
“deep structure” of narrative is not precisely Propp’s fabula or Genette’s story, both
of which are literary tools without making claims about cognition, but something
that fills that roll within the mind, awaiting further study which the theory of this
thesis hopes to hone in on. Also of notable worth from the cognitivist approaches to
narrative is Herman’s enumeration of the ways in which storytelling or narrative is
instrumental to the human mind, which provides a guiding path for future exploration
once fundamental narrative cognition is modeled.
The computational approaches to narrative make a number of distinct contribu-
tions to narrative theory and the work of this thesis. One of the primary purposes is
the implementation of theories: narrative comprehension offers a testing-ground for
some ideas from cognitivist approaches and theory on readership, while generative
approaches clearly take into account structuralism. In so doing a new sort of artifact
is produced; narratives of this new generation can be compared to the narratives upon
which the literary theories performed analysis in order to evaluate the the points of
greatest efficacy in the theories.
A final major contribution from the computational approaches is that they serve
to bridge the fields of computer science and narrative theory, offering a place for cross-
pollination and a range of insights from both fields. The results are in supporting work
like the theory in later chapters of this thesis, while also providing valuable resources
to the cognitivist case that narrative can be directly meaningful for cognition, if within
artificial intelligence then perhaps also in human cognition.
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CHAPTER III
MEMORY AND EVENTS IN NARRATIVE
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce key mechanisms of the human mind that
support narrative cognition and inform our understanding of how cognitive narrative
works. As narrative cognition is inextricably involved with human memory, particu-
larly the episodic and semantic long-term memory systems, first are considered the
memory systems that provide for narrative activity. Narrative influence has also been
demonstrated on short-term memory mechanisms, particularly perception. Together
these considerations help to gain an understanding of the overall relationship between
narrative and the human mind–the means by which narratives are a component of
our every-day intelligence as well as a portal into the mind.
This chapter begins by looking at the long term memory systems. Semantic
memory is considered in section 3.1; while the typical contents of semantic memory
seem distinctively non-narrative in form, they have direct impact upon the narrative
processes. Episodic memory is the subject of section 3.2 and is of central concern to
us as the storage place for life experiences, autobiographical memory, and even future
or vicarious experiences.
Finally, in section 3.3 we introduce Jeffrey Zacks’ Event Segmentation Theory
(EST), a theory of perception that suggests the means by which we perceive events
in the world around us. This perception is directly influenced by the contents of
semantic memory and produces events that become part of the contents of episodic
memory; crucially, these events are also the basis for personal narratives. EST is
supported by evidence that includes narrative comprehension and forms part of the
theoretical basis of the approach to narrative cognition that is presented in chapter 4.
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3.1 Semantic Memory
Semantic memory is the storage place for general information like facts and structures.
It is the system in human memory that most resembles the physical memory of today’s
computers, storing something like “random access” facts, memorized lists, or the long-
term principles that are digested and eventually separated from read or experienced
narratives. The term “semantic memory” was born at the same time as episodic
memory, originating to distinguish these systems from the over-arching declarative
memory [129].
Although semantic memory is not primarily narratively structured, narrative cog-
nition cannot proceed without its contributions any more than literary narratives
can exist without non-narrative components such as descriptions. Semantic memory
provides the substance and architecture of story worlds, particularly in the form of
scripts and schema. A major product of cognitive scientists Schank and Abelson’s
work on narrative comprehension in the 70’s and 80’s [120, 1], scripts describe the
usual order of actions within common activities, such as going to a restaurant or a
movie. Similarly, semantic memory is heavily at work in the highly patterned narra-
tives of oral cultures [115]; for example, the order in which the descriptors of oceans,
navies, and armaments are laid out in Homeric Greek epic.
Scripts, which are principally concerned with actions, can be considered a sub-
set of Bartlett’s schema [10]. Schema, which have been effectively cannonized into
theories of psychology by the work of researchers like Piaget and Rummelhart, are
particularly pertinent to conventional understanding of narrative as genres, which
provide the repertoire of concepts, tropes, and themes from which a narrative may
draw. Bartlett’s original work included narrative experiments in which subjects were
asked to recall a novel narrative from a foreign culture; relying upon their culturally
acquired schema for narratives, subjects were found to adjust their recollection of the
narratives to accomodate the schema with which they were familiar. These results
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Figure 4: Baddeley’s revised working memory model, including the episodic buffer
[4]
have had deep implications for our understanding of how human memory works and,
indeed, for crucial differences between creative, malleable human memory and the
verbatim memory of computers.
Semantic memory supplies the scripts, schemas, and genres by which top-down
processes influence narrative cognition [120] [108], and so plays a vital role in mature
narrative intelligence. Evidence from developing narrative intelligence within children
suggests that the acquisition of these narrative structures within semantic memory is
one of the significant forms of progress as children grow [135] [100, ch. 2]. However,
the same evidence indicates that however poor, some degree of narrative ability pre-
cedes the significant acquisition of semantic narrative structures and that one of the
functions of increasing experience is the construction of the scripts and schema that
will allow for improved top-down contributions to narrative intelligence. Narrative
intelligence, then, may begin with episodic memory before being augmented with
contributions from semantic memory.
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3.2 Episodic Memory
Episodic memory was introduced into the main body of psychology theory by En-
del Tulving’s seminal “Organization of Memory” [129]. Semantic memory has long
been understood to be our primary memory system and the target of most tradi-
tional forms of education. It is the store for isolated facts, from geographic capitols
to mathematical formulae to word definitions. The contribution of Tulving’s innova-
tion was to suggest that the human experience consists of much more than isolated
facts but is, in fact, characterized by events that occur in a temporal context and
are interconnected over time and by the flow of cause-and-effect and can be empiri-
cally differentiated from eachother. Tulving’s 1986 paper on the distinction between
episodic and semantic memory [130] demonstrates a response to the sort of challenges
that initially opposed his addition to the vocabulary of memory psychology. Initial
critics viewed episodic memory as an unnecessary complication of the memory model,
a subset of semantic memory that muddied the waters without bringing any useful
additions to the table. Gradually these concerns were laid to rest as both illnesses
and memory functions came to corroborate the reality of episodic memory.
As the theory of episodic memory grew in credence it soon interacted with what
continues today as one of the major short-term memory models, Baddeley’ and Hitch’s
multi-component working memory model [5]. This memory model represents working
memory, the short term memory employed in human awareness and cognition, and
originally accounted only for sensory input conforming to the visuospatial sketchpad
and phonetic loop. The model leaves up to interpretation the interaction with var-
ious models of long-term memory, initially causing it to seem segregated from any
long term system like episodic memory. This division has proven untenable, how-
ever. Modern research has prompted Baddeley to extend his original model. He
proposed the addition of an episodic buffer (visible in the middle of figure 4) to offer
an explanation for the binding problem (whereby diverse stimuli are perceived as a
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coherent whole), resistance to expected problems involving rehearsal suppression in
the phonological loop, and situations in which those with severe amnesia were able
to exceed phonological loop limits for prose-text recall by exhibiting “chunking,” a
process largely associated with long term memory (see [4]). This episodic buffer was
proposed for use in short-term memory complementary to the conventionally under-
stood episodic long-term memory [4]. The role of Baddeley’s short-term episodic
buffer is as a holding area for retrieved episodes to be integrated cross-modally with
data from other sources, such as perception or semantic processing. From a narrative
perspective, this may be where stories are constructed through blending with other
elements in working and semantic memory, and may be where narratives are manip-
ulated for functions of narrative cognition such as those suggested by David Herman
[47].
Episodic memory is the system responsible for storage of both personal expe-
riences and any other time-situated events attended to second-hand, for example
through media or personally communicated stories [51]. It is also implicated for
prospective memory used to consider the future [118, 119, 106], supporting Tulving’s
original description of episodic memory as being for “mental time travel.” In the
last two decades a flurry of research has been directed at episodic memory; partic-
ularly relevant to narrative studies is the distinction of an episodic sub-system at
work in autobiographical memory, a distinction supported by the psychological data
[94, 71, 132] and distinguished from non-autonoetic memories that do not include
personal awareness or presence as part of the substance of the memory [103].
3.3 Event Segmentation Theory
Event Segmentation Theory (EST, figure 5) [139, 56, 108] is a theory of perception
that incorporates long term and short term memory. In humans, event segmentation
is an ongoing process occurring simultaneously at multiple time/action granularities.
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Figure 5: A high-level view of EST, image from [139]. Information flows along gray
arrows and error detection leads to resetting of event models, which is the only time
sensory input is gated to them.





These three features and their relevance not only to perception but to our theory of
cognitive narrative will be considered in turn.
The hierarchicality of perception comes into play in the fact that perception oc-
curs at multiple levels of granularity; for example, the presence of a fly swatter, the
movement of a fly swatter, the recognition of a guiding hand, and so forth. A different
example is hierarchical ordering for orientation, whereby the orientation of an object
is determined after considering its relation to its surroundings [122]. In each of these
cases perception is hierarchical insomuch as there is perception of components and
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subordinate/superordinate relationships, or there are subordinate relationships in the
types of perception that occurs. This characteristic of perception is evidenced in the
successive transformation of representations. The characteristic of hierarchicality also
has a bearing on narratives, which have as a fundamental characteristic the ability to
be composed into larger (higher-level) narrative structures, as occurs with narrative
summarization [80] or with meta-narratives [18, 45].
Recurrence within perception refers to the fact that later stages of perception
(such as prediction) can effect earlier stages of perception (as they occur in future
cycles). In perception this is evident when the presence or absence of an object is
overlooked by observers of a scene until realization of the greater context occurs. With
narrative recurrence is related to the delibarative, iterative nature that is observed
with the development natural narratives, particularly when they are negotiated with
collaborators [100, ch. 1].
Finally, cyclicality refers to the continuous, ongoing processes of perception, the
same which are repeated in illustration of recurrence. Further, perceptual predic-
tions are constantly compared to actual perception and the results guide ongoing
perception. This, we suggest, constitutes a significant difference between perception
and narrative intelligence or the narrative generation that occurs in cognition; as a
complex, deliberate process, cognitive narrative generation is not continuous, as sug-
gested by the role of episodic memory and the reflective processes often used, betwixt
gaps in other activities, to perform narrative sense-making of past experiences or cre-
ation of future expectations (as with the toddler’s personal storytelling of both past
and future in the crib by night [100, ch. 2]). This is not to suggest, however, that
narrative cognition does not effect perception, as EST plainly indicates in the use
of event models and schema, below. According to EST, event segmentation occurs
as an effect of ongoing perceptual prediction. During the process of perception two
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structures are the primary participatants in parsing the situation and forming predic-
tions: long-term knowledge is brought to bear in the form of event schemata, which
are similar to Schanks’ and Abelson’s scripts [120] and represent the way actions or
events normally unfold in similar situations; and working-memory is brought to bear
by event models, which are an interpretation of the specific situation at hand. In
addition, behavioral models may be used so that predictions can be made based on
the presumed goals of the actors in a situation, and world models that account for
physical expectations (e.g. the trajectory of an object in free motion). The inter-
play between the semantic and episodic long-term memory systems in this process is
cyclical: semantic memory provides the structures and models to help make episodes
from experience, while these episodes are committed to episodic memory where, over
time, they help distill further knowledge of semantic structures.
As perception occurs, the mind selects from its knowledge of usual event schemas
and uses assumptions about the goals and processes at work in the attended situation
to generate expectations of what will happen next. As long as these predictions are
mostly fulfilled, the current event model is assumed to continue and no segmentation
occurs. However, when the predictions are wrong by some margin of significance, the
current event is considered to end and a new event begin in the process of selecting or
generating a new event model. These explanations of event segmentation have been
supported by evidence from studies of segmentation of event boundaries in written
and video narratives [139]. Narratives are constructed as segmentation occurs at
broader granularities over episodic memory, to the point of eventually contributing
to production of the life-long autobiographical memories that “make up our own
personal narrative of who we are and what we have experienced” [108, ch. 8].
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CHAPTER IV
A THEORY OF NARRATIVE COGNITION
Previous chapters have discussed narrative theory and psychology supporting nar-
rative cognition. Narrative cognition seems to be an essential component of human
thought and is instrumental in the way that we interact, are entertained, express
ourselves, and make sense of life. It is also a capability mostly foreign to artificial
intelligence that could open vast possibilities if implemented in systems that inter-
act with us and produce for us, whether they are performing (as with expressive
AI), playing (video games), or collaborating (artistically, for utility, or in team-based
activities). In this chapter we detail an approach to implementing basic cognitive nar-
rative by applying Event Segmentation Theory within the Soar cognitive architecture.
We begin by introducing cognitive architectures and their narrative-relevant capabil-
ities and concerns. We next look into the digital media applications and implications
of cognitive architectures in general, many of which are unexplored. The chapter
culminates in with the details of a specific architecture, Soar, and the considered
implementation and capabilities of EST and narrative cognition within Soar.
4.1 Cognitive Architectures
Human cognition, though central to every human activity of interest including the
artistic and expressive, is a black box: it is not yet possible for us to directly ob-
serve the workings of the human mind. As an approach to dealing with the mystery
of cognition, a cognitive architecture represents a system-implemented theory of hu-
man cognition. While not definitively computer-implemented, often the term includes
computer frameworks built to implement the theories. As an approach to cognitive
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psychology these programs provide opportunities in the first-degree to test psycho-
logical theories and, should the results be similar to human results on the same tests,
gain support for the given model’s cognitive feasibility. This then provides a wide
range of second-degree utility as predictions on new tests can be extended to humans.
Given a suitable cognitive architecture, we can use it to estimate the effectiveness pro-
grams or designs are likely to have for human recipients, or how humans may respond
to an artifact.
In addition to serving as a psychological tool, cognitive architectures have also
become an instrument in the field of artificial intelligence. Though researchers in
the field of AI are not always concerned with how human cognition works, humans
are generally considered the standard for intelligence. Cognitive architectures have
become favored as AI systems that can be the brains behind robots and simulations.
From this perspective the architecture represents a productive system, capable of
generative behavior in its own right. And between these two poles–that of systems
for approximating human cognition and systems to function as artificial intelligence–
is the common ground of a system which, to some degree, will should be able to
provide a more human-like collaborator in human-computer interaction scenarios,
a use of interest from human-computer military teams to games and expressive AI
experiences.
4.1.1 A Brief Overview of Cognitive Architectures
There are a variety of approaches to modelling cognition, each with a different central
focus and separate themes. Cognitive architectures, by definition, tend to represent
integrated approaches: that is, a system that strives to capture as much of the overall
process of general cognition as possible–including memory, perception, knowledge,
and learning. Such unified approaches are sometimes labelled unified general in-
telligence systems [31], but in this work we will refer to them as Unified Theories
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of Cognition (UTC), following Allen Newell’s seminal work [95] and highlighting the
fact that the systems being considered are both computer programs and also concrete
theories modelling cognition. UTC are differentiated from expert systems, which aim
to do a single thing very well but are neither general nor system-aware–that is, are less
effectively poised to recognize system-level context or how different tools can share
resources and contribute jointly to the design of a single system. In addition to the
appeal of a system that provides flexibility and generality, UTC seem particularly
well positioned to address the ubiquitousness and breadth of narrative, something
that is hard to imagine any specialized, expert system addressing.
Cognitive architectures can be likened to structural architecture, which includes
consideration of the walls and roof but is not usually concerned with furniture or
wall-hangings. Likewise cognitive architectures are concerned with the general, un-
changing qualities of a cognitive model: the memory systems, the ways memories can
be represented within those systems, and the way those systems can be functionally
utilized (including learning mechanisms), but not specific knowledge or pre-scripted
applications.
Langley, Laird, and Rogers’ recent consideration of the challenges and design con-
siderations of cognitive architectures suggests that they can be defined by a set of
capabilities and that they can be compared and differentiated by consideration of the
properties that enable these capabilities [67]. The defining capabilities of an archi-
tecture include the recognition and categorization of data (especially environmental
and contextual data), decision-making, perception, and execution of action. In ad-
dition, five other capabilities of cognitive architectures are particularly relevant to
our approach to cognitive narrative: prediction and monitoring, problem solving and
planning, belief maintenance, communication, and remembering. These latter five
will be considered in turn. Of the five highlighted capabilities of cognitive architec-
tures, most are related to this fundamental property of cognitive architectures: that
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applications of cognitive architectures exist over time. This leads to profound distinc-
tions between cognitive architectures and programs or AI approaches of more static
type, which exhibit a more-or-less timeless concept of memory or which are started
afresh for each new (sub-)task.
4.1.1.1 Capability for Prediction
Prediction is required by systems that operate in sensitive environments, particu-
larly those that include other agents. The importance of prediction for a cognitive
agent is clear if we consider a car-driving AI, for instance, which needs to be able to
assess the likely outcome of its own actions and those of any nearby drivers. Consid-
ered alongside prediction is monitoring, by which senses are related to predictions.
Such child-like challenges as catching a rolled ball require facilities for prediction and
monitoring.
The concept of narrative intelligence being discussed in this thesis is based fun-
damentally upon prediction, which is the process by which the events that compose
narratives are generated from senses and experience. For cognitive architectures the
call is to not only possess the ability to make predictions over classes of observations
and their associated domains, but also to exhibit the ability to learn prediction mod-
els. As ability for prediction improves we can expect that the stories derived from the
exceptions to more sophisticated prediction will also improve. This is could produce
the kind of improvement in narrative maturity that is observed in children [13] [100,
ch. 2].
4.1.1.2 Capability for Planning
UTC systems are expected to perform in novel situations and against problems that
have not been seen before. For such tasks as these the system must be capable
of generating a sequence of actions based upon its beliefs about the world and its
predictions, which actions will achieve the system’s goal. Not only is planning required
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for strategic endeavors like a chess game, without some form of planning capabilities
the not-so intelligent agent would be unlikely to efficiently cross a room or achieve
the most basic multi-step tasks.
Planning and expectation have been pointed out as among the cognitive func-
tions for which humans often apply narrative [47, 50], and plans are one of the chief
structures representing narrative in narrative generation systems [84]. An interest
in planning provides common ground for a symbiotic relationship between cognitive
architectures and narrative. Systems from both endeavors provide mechanisms that
could be mutually beneficial for tasks of general and narrative intelligence. Inasmuch
as different cognitive architectures approach the problem of planning differently each
can suggest a different native conception of narrative structure in harmony with that
arrangement of planning. For instance, the Soar architecture’s planning-as-subgoaling
has different implications for a narrative structure than the skill-hierarchy of the
ICARUS system [66], both of which may invite interesting differences from the sto-
ries produced by the conventional backward-chaining approach to planning adopted
by many narrative generation systems [69, 109]. With planning already established
as a methodology for narrative generation, the inherent planning capabilities of cog-
nitive architectures offer ready approaches for narrative generation within cognitive
architectures while the converse insight into narrative’s relationship to planning from
the field of narrative generation promises useful resources as narrative intelligence is
incorporated into UTC.
4.1.1.3 Capability for Belief Maintenance
Belief maintenance is paired with reasoning in the analysis of Langley et al [67]. In
their context “belief” is a technical term referring to an agent’s knowledge about
a partially-observed world, and reasoning is responsible for generating beliefs from
perception, knowledge, or other beliefs. In other words, a belief is knowledge that
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is subject to being incomplete or false but, nevertheless, is taken more-or-less fac-
tually for the time being. They give the example of a pilot who might conclude
that an approaching plane is an enemy if it changes to an intercept course. For cog-
nitive architectures reasoning and belief maintenance is centrally a concern of the
representation of knowledge itself and, in particular, the representation of conceptual
relationships–for example, Soar’s directed graphs or the formal logic of PRODIGY
[25].
Clearly this concern of cognitive architectures for belief maintenance is pertinent to
narrative cognition, as narrative comprehension is itself centrally about maintaining
an accurate set of beliefs as to the situation and prospects of a narrative (see section
2.2.1) and narrative coherence, one of the crucial axes of narrative quality, is closely
related to the degree to which the readers’ beliefs are managed by a narrative (i.e.
reader beliefs about story world should be mostly satisfied with deliberate dramatic
exception). In turn narratives, whether received by communication or from memory
and experience, offer a crucial source of beliefs and a valuable resource for reasoning.
Belief maintenance is closely related to the concept of story world [136, 48, 82], the
constructed reality that holds within a story and includes actions, internal history,
characters, and rules of causality. Narratively-engaged humans are involved in a
constant process of belief construction, maintenance, and revision in precisely the
ways with which cognitive architectures are concerned.
4.1.1.4 Capability for Communication
As has been stated by cognitive scientist and design scholar Gerhard Fisher, “The
power of the unaided individual mind is highly overrated” [35]. As tasks involving
human-computer interaction, and even agent-agent computer interaction, become
increasingly prevalent, the need for cognitive agents to communicate with humans
and each other is pressingly obvious. Cognitive architectures, by very nature of their
53
generality, need to be designed with communication in mind and consideration of
the ability to translate and interpret signals to and from knowledge. Langley et al
highlight the additional importance of episodic memory, above and beyond semantic
memory, for communicative activities that refer to past events and cognitive activities.
However, despite the need for extra-agent communication, the enormity of the task
of bringing to bear language or other communicative facilities has resulted in only
slow progress in the area of communication ability.
Upon this point narrative strikes with its primeval role as a means of commu-
nicating prior to even its role as entertainment [27, 115]. Communication has been
highlighted as one of the key cognitive roles of narrative [50] (section 2.3). The gap
between word-level understanding and actual discursive proficiency prompted some
of the original pioneering forrays into computational narrative [120] and points to
the key role narrative plays as a structure and intelligent capacity for rich contextual
and affective communication. The efficiency of narrative for encoding rich social in-
formation has been remarked upon as a quality of central utility for narrative [81],
and narratives have been considered “the most compact and informative structures”
for representing high-volume event data [133]. These reasons provide strong support
for the utility of narrative cognition in cognitive architectures, and inversely for the
appropriateness of expressive applications of cognitive architectures for performing
narrative roles in digital media programs.
4.1.1.5 Capability for Remembering
At first the notion of remembering as a significant capability of a cognitive architecture
might seem obvious insomuch as computers are known for their memory capacities,
since the dawn of the computer age. The difference for an architecture is that it is,
to some extent, embodied as a complex cognitive system across a span of time within
a rich situation. The capacity of remembering serves to highlight the fact that total
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encoding of all perception would be both undesirable and intractable for domains
scaling upwards to real-world complexity, as well as insufficient for the needs of a
cognitive system; in the design of a cognitive architecture decisions must be made as
to what will be remembered, how it will be encoded, and when and how it will be
recalled. For instance, Soar [61] is distinguished as one of the only architectures to
support episodic memory that indexes instantiated data with time labels; EPIC [87]
has distinct memory modules for visual, auditory, and touch data; and CLARION
[124] uses neural networks to encode its perceptions. Each of these designs impli-
cates different functions for retrieving memories and different assumptions about how
memory works.
In addition to the obvious importance of memory design to decision-making, re-
flection and learning are dependent upon the memory systems. Reflection indicates
the ability of an agent to target as the subject of its cognition its actual knowledge
structures and the product of its previous cognition; for instance, for retrospection or
re-analysis, when an agent might think about what it previously thought, or in our
case, for re-evaluating or reforming a story in memory.
Learning is a final important capability of cognitive architectures, considered
jointly with remembering and reflection, that is particularly relevant to the time-
embedded nature of cognitive architectures: unlike many machine learning approaches
that have an off-line learning phase prior to their actual execution, agents of cogni-
tive architectures would need to perform learning while on-line during run-time. All
of the architecture’s systems that are relied upon by remembering are shared with
any learning functions, which also take as their primary subject the actual knowl-
edge structures being produced by the agent. Because narrative seems to constitute
a primary knowledge structure in the human mind (section 2.3), narrative cognition
is instrumental to learning. A narratively intelligent agent will also use narrative as
one of the chief currencies of remembering and reflecting.
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4.1.1.6 Episodic Memory and the Capabilities of Architectures
It has been established that a defining characteristic of cognitive architectures is that
they exist in and through time. One of the implications of this fact is that episodic
memory, which is centrally concerned with events in time, is particularly relevant
to cognitive architectures. In addition, as has been discussed in chapter 3 episodic
memory is inextricable from narrative cognition; applications for episodic memory
are applications for narrative cognition, and implementation of narrative cognition
promises benefits for the five highlighted capabilities.
Belief maintenance within AI systems has often been implemented without a strict
concept of episodic memory (e.g. [90]). These systems dynamically track what is
believed at the current time, which may be changed by new observations, but are
usually unable to reflect upon any history of changes or to regard what was believed
at a particular past point in time (though there are notable exceptions [30]). Episodic
memory within a cognitive architecture can support reasoning that extends beyond
the current belief state to trends in past belief states, and mechanisms for this sort
of reasoning can be particularly relevant if applied to other agents to reason about
their past and current likely belief states.
Prediction and planning benefit from the expectations provided by narratives,
whether those narratives are experiential or mediated (section 2.3). This forms a
virtuous cycle as the provided predictions are observed and the results are return to
further strengthen or modify the next predictions. Plans are both recognized and
created based upon previous plans, which can be encoded as narratives and, when
brought to real-world and experiential context, are likely to take the form of forward-
facing narratives. Indeed, mental “time travel” into the future is one of the functions
of episodic memory within humans. Prediction is central to the notion of narrative
cognition examined int his thesis, as the basic elements of narrative are seen as a
product of failed predictions.
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As has been previously mentioned the problem of communication is immense and,
for this reason, has been daunting to developers and researchers of integrated archi-
tectures. However, it is an increasingly incumbent challenge that must be addressed,
and it may be impossible to implement language proficiency on a discourse level with-
out an episodic memory system to support it in obvious tasks like anaphora resolution
and with speech acts and received narratives. Narrative is one of the most important
forms of communication and is probably impossible to comprehend without some
form of episodic memory [126, 12, 140]. For these reasons we may expect there to
be little progress toward human-level communication in cognitive architectures until
functions of episodic memory are implemented.
However, episodic memory has been implemented in very few cognitive architec-
tures. This is likely in part because of the novel nature of episodic memory compared
to the atemporal semantic memory, which is the standard notion of memory in most
computer systems, and also in part due to traditional computer tasks not requiring
episodic memory (for example, arithmetic is not typically a narrative process). Be-
cause of this, UTC applications of episodic memory have been little explored and
there is much exploration to be done. Narrative cognition and narrative intelligence
is a natural application for episodic memory.
4.1.2 Soar
The Soar cognitive architecture is one of the best-researched and most heavily ap-
plied cognitive architectures to date. Developed in the early 80s by Allen Newell, Paul
Rosenbloom, and John Laird [58, 64, 65], the system stems in part from Newell’s ear-
lier work on a general problem solver [96]. The theme of generalization is in contrast
to expert systems, one of the prevalent forms of AI that produce specially trained
systems with highly specific knowledge and capabilities designed for a single task.
Newell’s work is distinctively human-facing and under his direction Soar developed
57
Figure 6: The Soar cognitive architecture [59]
simultaneously as a theory of human cognition, based on physical symbolic reason-
ing and a minimal set of architectural structures, and a computational realization
of that theory. Newell’s work ultimately found articulation in his production of the
William James lectures and the resultant book Unified Theories of Cognition [95],
wherein Newell calls for theories that attempt to address intelligence as a whole, and
provides his own such theory which is incarnated in the Soar architecture. Newell
designed the Soar architecture to reflect the concept of problem spaces [97, 98], in
which intelligence is defined in terms of goal-directed problem-solving capability and
problems are defined discretely, meaning that the approach to problem solving can
be differentiated from the problem itself and, so long as different problem spaces can
be defined, the same system can be used on a variety of the problem spaces. This
general approach to intelligence provides certain advantages that are alluded to even
in the title of Kelley and Long’s article Deep Blue Cannot Play Checkers [53], which
is particularly concerned with AI approaches that support real-world robots.
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After the loss of Allen Newell (1927-1992) Soar’s development continued under
John Laird’s supervision and drifted away from Newell’s emphasis on human mod-
elling. In his 2013 book Laird differentiates modern Soar from human modelling
architectures like ACT-R [3] by calling Soar “human inspired” [61, p. 3]. This high-
lights several important points: first, in the field of AI cognition does not always
imply human cognition. Second and resultant, cognitive architectures may not be
concerned with human cognition so much as with producing intelligent behavior even
if by means that are not “cognitively plausible” by human standards. While this point
is important to understand the lay of the land in cognitive architecture research, it
does not pose a problem for this work. While Laird’s current emphasis in Soar de-
velopment is not focused on human plausibility, changes to Soar in no way invalidate
or remove functionality from Newell’s work and do not jeopardize the concepts of
narrative cognition that have been layed out in this thesis.
As has been mentioned Soar’s emphasis on generality makes it a particularly strong
candidate for implementation of narrative intelligence. Narrative’s ubiquitous nature
necessitates generality in any approach to capture it with any breadth, and so the
similarity between a Soar problem space and a narrative story world is useful. Soar
is also a symbolic system which means it is suited to capturing concepts of varying
levels of abstraction, particularly at greater elevations of abstraction than connec-
tionist systems may be able. Because stories themselves exhibit broadly abstracted
features, such as the genres, schema, focalizers, and other generalizing features dis-
cussed in chapter 2 there is an acute advantage to the capacity of symbolic approaches
to capture higher-level concepts. Finally, Soar is a particularly suitable candidate for
implementation of narrative intelligence because it is one of the few cognitive archi-
tectures to support a form of episodic memory. While Soar’s episodic memory does
not precisely capture the concept of episodes or episodic memory as it is regarded in
humans (see chapter 3), it does capture some dimension of time and provides a useful
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Figure 7: Soar’s semantic and working memory systems [61]
starting point that will be discussed in greater detail below.
Soar has several key features of its operation which bear further discussion below.
In turn we will consider: Soar’s declarative knowledge representations, which can be
represented as directed graphs and include memory. It is in these knowledge repre-
sentations that any details of a story–for example, Hansel and Grettel’s use of bread
crumbs–would be encoded. Soar’s procedural knowledge representations provide for
rules and decision-making activities; such considerations as genre expectations and
character decisions, as well as any instructions for story telling, could be here-encoded.
Finally we will consider Soar’s overall cycle of operation in which all the parts come
together to produce the UTC.
4.1.2.1 Soar’s Declarative Memory
Soar’s declarative memory systems include working memory, episodic memory, and
semantic memory, and have been optimized to run efficiently for rich-domain tasks
like real-world robots for an hour or longer [63]. Each of these memory systems is
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represented as nodes along a directed graph where child concepts are located farther
down the graph and can potentially be traced upwards to their ancestors, as pic-
tured in figure 7. Working memory represents a Soar agent’s awareness of the world
around, including physical observations (e.g. for robotic systems), retrieved mem-
ories currently being brought to bear, and information generated by inferences and
other reasoning processes (including concrete expectations and predictions). From
a story-understanding perspective, the story world would be represented (at least
partially) in working memory, including what characters are present, the understood
knowledge-state of those characters, etc. Working memory is the most rapidly and
regularly changing memory base.
In working memory all concepts–called Working Memory Elements (WMEs)–are
decendents of a single root, the state. When substates are created the elements of
that substate branch off common substate root. With Semantic memory, on the other
hand, separate isolated structures exist. These represent independent facts that may
need to persist and may not be specifically related to the situation at hand. While
working memory exists only in the instant of the agent, semantic memory can be
stored and populated between active lifetimes of a Soar agent and can be stored
externally of the agent in a database.
Soar’s episodic memory (“epmem,” figure 8) is structured identically to working
memory because, in fact, it it constitutes snapshots of working memory. Retrieving
an episodic memory retrieves the full working memory of the agent at some point
in time. Like semantic memory, episodic memory can be stored off-line so that an
agent’s memories can be retrieved over extended periods of time, essentially providing
an extended lifetime for an agent.
Unlike human episodic memory, Soar’s episodic memory is exhaustive and does
not actually include a concept of what most would consider a requirement for being
an episode: a sequence of events fixating on some notable happening. Each episode
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Figure 8: Soar’s episodic memory system [61]
in epmem is a single state from Soar’s experience with the only linking factors in
epmem being the the time sequence by which epmem can be traversed forward and
backward one state at a time. The only topography or delineation to epmem is the
degree to which episodes match search queries, with each episodic snapshot being
matched against a fragment of a graph knowledge structure so that searches like
“memories with bread crumbs” can be retrieved. However, while this is a significant
distinction from an actual narrative structure with causation and perhaps a dramatic
arc, the principle of this thesis is to use the qualities of exhaustiveness and time-
sequence available in Soar’s episodic memory to construct narratives according to
Event Segmentation Theory.
4.1.2.2 Soar’s Production Memory and Rules
The declarative memory previously discussed represents memory concerned with de-
tails and specific observations, which is subject to frequent addition and modification.
Soar’s production memory (figure 9) can instead be thought of as memory for heuris-
tics, logic rules, habits, and fast responses. For Hansel production memory might
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Figure 9: An abstract view of Soar’s production memory, with unrelated productions
[62, p. 16]
include the instruction that when something frightening (like that fast-approaching
witch) is oncoming, run! The rules that are encoded into production memory can be
thought of as if-then statements in which the conditions–referred to as “right hand
side” or RHS–match against working memory and results–“left hand side” or LHS–
alter or add to working memory, query either of the long-term declarative memory
systems, or change preferences for operators.
Production memory is the primary working ground for Soar’s learning systems.
While acquisition of knew data is simply a matter of adding to one of the declar-
ative memory systems, learning new skills is much more interesting. Soar makes
this possible by what it refers to as “chunking” (different from psychology defini-
tions of the term as an information grouping mechanism), by which Soar internalizes
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a result-producing process of cognition and maps the input directly to the output,
optimizing the process by cutting out the middle-work. A trivial human example
of Soar-style chunking would be to solve a simple math problem like 79 divided by
3. For us the solution might come about by first getting the nearest solution that
we know, carrying digits or dividing for a decimal value, and finally producing our
answer. Soar-style chunking would then simply memorize that 79/3 = 26.333 and
future encounters with the problem would then, essentially, be solved by checking
memory, rather than performing any of the calculations that were originally needed.
In a task of story telling, chunking could be responsible, for example, for learning
when to change scenes/focalizers.
If, drawing upon the perspective of Propp’s narrative structure and generation
discussed in sections 2.2.2 and for narrative generation in section 2.4.2, we decompose
stories into a triad of fabula, sjuzhet, and text, we could consider the fabula as being
stored in long-term (declarative) memory and the rules in production memory as
resulting in the system’s storytelling ability as they work up on the fabula to compose
an plan for telling the story (sjuzhet) and then output the actual telling (text). For our
task of narrative cognition procedural memory will be most important for encoding
the means by which narrative cognition actually occurs, accounting, for example, for
the five functions of narrative instrumentality enumerated by Herman ( [50], section
2.3). Most importantly to this thesis, even prior to that implementation of narrative
intelligence, procedural memory will encode the means by which EST is implemented
to construct narratives from episodic experiences (the focus of section 4.2).
4.2 A Theory of NI-Soar
Soar’s episodic memory modules (epmem) depicted in the top right corner of figure
6 were added relatively recently and are our central focus. Soar’s epmem works by
storing snapshots of the working memory state (i.e. the Soar agent’s awareness) at
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each time step, attaching to each snapshot a unique index representing the time of
the memory. Once Soar has recalled an episodic memory it is possible to increment
forward or backward through the neighboring episodes. Retrieval of episodic memory
occurs as queries are issued searching for matching or partially matching features in
the graph-structure knowledge representation. Results are given a match score based
on how much of the query-graph matches the graphs in an episode, and the best
match is returned.
The aim of this project is to outline the addition of fundamental narrative in-
telligence within the Soar theory of cognition (hence NI-Soar); we propose to start
with narrative intelligence on the most basic of levels, not aspiring beyond child-level
narrative intelligence at this point. With this starting point groundwork is laid for
future work refining the model.
The implementation proposed proceeds as follows: Soar provides sensory input
which is represented in working memory and stored over time as episodes in epmem.
These provide the information stream required by EST to make the predictions that
result in discrete events. These events are the building blocks of narratives according
to the simple definition of narrative as consisting of a sequence of causally related
events, which also allows for the consideration of narrative as consisting of as little
as a single event (as may be seen with a child’s first narratives).
4.2.1 Predictions
At the heart of EST is the making of predictions, which may receive input from a
variety of sources including scripts and schema, behavioral character models, genre
expectations, and other inputs from semantic memory. As has been previously men-
tioned the resources available for these processes develops with the experience of the
agent. As this exploration considers naive agents with a minimum of prior knowledge
it is desirable to have universal heuristics that can form the basis for prediction across
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domains. Making the simplification of a world consisting of agentive and non-agentive
components we consider two heuristics purely as a starting point. Both of these stand
to be superceded as knowledge is gained by the agent.
The heuristic of inertia pertains to non-agentive components of the world, such as
spatial configurations. The agent may predict that its environment will continue to
exhibit the same features that it now exhibits.
The heuristic of auto-simulation applies to agentive components of the world and
takes one of the simplest approaches to a theory of mind by assuming that a perceived
agent will act in the same way as the perceiver.
These heuristics are admittedly simplistic but provide a ground case to create
predictions in any situation, the violation of which delineates the events necessary
to form narratives. The result is a stream of events that is, in the worst case of a
rapidly and inscrutably changing environment, identical to epmem and will, with any
stability to the environment or shared rationality of the agents, be an abstraction
over the episodes.
4.2.2 Linking Events Into Narratives
The definition of narrative here adopted has sometimes been interpreted as allowing
for single-event narratives, as when a toddler recalls repeatedly that today “I fell
down.” Such interpretation draws no distinction between event and narrative, a
point of ambiguity further promulgated by Zacks’ explanations of EST.
The distinction we propose is not one of structure but of function.
EST provides events as a natural kind by which we perceive the world, just as
we discern discrete objects. According to EST this perception can occur reflexively.
Narrative, on the contrary, is deliberate and negotiated.
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Figure 10: An explanatory screenshot of Soar’s Eaters game [60]
4.2.3 Considering a Domain: Eaters
While Soar is fully capable of recording the richness of real-world perception (e.g.
in its robotic applications), generating the events with EST which are requisite for
narrative generation requires that the system be capable of making useful predictions,
which in turn requires rules capturing the complexity of the domain. Games make
useful simplified domains that can produce readily observable results. Soar ships with
several game domains that can make testing-grounds for introductory exploration of
this approach; we take as an example the Eaters domain [92].
The Eaters game (figure 10, [60]) is a two-dimensional Pacman-like game in which
one or more colorful “eaters” navigate within a randomly generated maze with the
goal of achieving the high score by consuming food pellets of lesser or greater point-
values. The eaters are capable of only two types of action: moving one space at a time
in any of the four cardinal directions, which type of movement has no cost, or jumping
up to two squares away, which costs the equivalent of a lesser food pellet. By jumping,
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an Eater can pass over an obstacle but never consumes food over which it has jumped.
When eaters collide, they are each randomly transported elsewhere in the world and
their scores are averaged with each other. Each Eater agent has a limited range of
vision and discovers the world as it moves. This feature of partial-observability is
desirable for mechanisms that rely upon prediction, as does an EST-based approach
to narrative intelligence.
Even within so simple a domain as Eaters prediction is still possible and interest-
ing. Because of the partially-observed nature of the domain a natural opportunity
for prediction is in world-state itself. For example, will the given wall continue indef-
initely? For how long will the current trail of food proceed? Predictions answering
these sorts of questions about world-state are possible even in one-agent scenarios.
If scenarios admit multiple participants, more complex prediction becomes possible
based on changes to world state (in Eaters, the consumption of food) and direct ob-
servations of other agents. Changes in the world state make an ideal opportunity for
event segmentation as such changes are likely to be unexpected. Behavioral predic-
tion becomes possible if agents in a multi-agent scenario are permitted some degree
of a theory of mind, with a näıve implementation being to assume that other agents
will perform as would the subject agent. More sophisticated behavioral models might
enable an agent to comprehend the possibility of alternative possible goals in oppos-
ing agents, with event boundaries providing an ideal opportunity for evaluation and
modification of the model it attributes to other agents.
4.3 Discussion and Conclusions
Successful application of EST will produce events from epmem; an event will consist of
some number of episodes. A narrative, then, consists of one or more events. As Ochs’
recounts, children often begin their narrative practice by creating one-event stories
[100], with the narratives growing in complexity as the children mature. Thus, while
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the approach outlined will produce child-like narratives, there is wide room for future
work that considers ways of composing compound narratives from atomic narratives.
Such considerations from researchers like Propp form the basis of modern narratology
and continue to be explored [105, 42, 34]. The proposal of this work is that single-
event narratives of the sort produced by EST with Soar are atomic and may serve as
building-blocks for any other narrative structures.
Eventually narrative intelligence will be an instrument for general intelligence, at
which time we could expect that agents with greater narrative intelligence would have
a competitive advantage in games like Eaters. As an introductory exploration, the
chief product of the approach proposed are the narratives themselves, preliminary to
more advanced functions of intelligence. However child-like (even toddler-like) these
minimal narratives may be at the start, the function that can provide them will meet
needs of both quality and quantity.
A system that is able to continually produce narratives from its experiences has
the potential to offer the sort of statistical data valuable for categorization and norm
detection, both considered some of the fundamental purposes of cognitive narrative
in humans [47]. It also offers a promising starting-place for automated generation of
scripts within a domain, which could be a useful complement to crowd-sourced script
generation that can be costly and unpredictable [73]. Together, these capabilities
may serve in support of advanced cognition like goal-based reasoning [114], whereby
consideration of narrative schema could provide resources for adaptation or change
of goals in dynamic scenarios.
Regardless of the episodic memory implementation, a system that produces ex-
periential narratives will also capture qualities of coherence that are desirable in a
narrative system. Insofar as narrative is concerned with having a “continuant sub-
ject,” experiential narratives minimally satisfy that by providing the experiencer as
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subject. This fact is not insignificant for applications in Human-Computer Interac-
tions, Expressive AI, or Affective Computing, where “self” for continuity of subject
may provide resources for desirable development of personality and style within an
agent [54].
A concluding line of work worth mentioning would be observer-systems which
would consider primarily other agents as the subject of their predictions and narra-
tives. Such systems would enhance the quality of the narratives generated by develop-
ing narratives based on human or expert-system performance and would be important
steps toward tasks such as automated sports commentary [2], summarization [107, 70],
and theory of mind [43]. One of the severe challenges facing the development of ef-
fective observer systems is having an approach to narrative intelligence that can be
generalized across domains. The development of general story-generation algorithms
suitable for general cognitive architectures is one strategy for approaching such useful





This thesis has provided a broad literature review and a theory for narrative cognition.
The literature review includes narrative approaches from drama, communication and
social theories, literary approaches, and computational approaches. In particular
emphasis is placed on the notions of cognitive narrative, both as they have been
proceeded as developments from traditional narratology and as they are related to
mechanisms in cognitive psychology. The result is a focusing upon narrative not as
a special case or by distinct artifacts, but rather as a human universal irrespective of
society, media, or language.
The addition of computational narrative approaches to the theoretical discussion
serves several purposes. First, this is regarded as a development as natural and no less
significant than historical narrative innovations like the novel, which itself served to
alter the form, consumption, and understood nature of stories. Computational narra-
tive offers new ways of creating traditional-form narratives, of experiencing new forms
of narratives, and of processing the increasing wealth of narratives that continually
surrounds us.
The approach to cognitive narrative outlined in this thesis might also be regarded
as computational, insomuch as a computationally realized cognitive architecture is
considered and approaches from artificial intelligence (including some of those used
in the computational narrative systems considered in 2.4) are relevant and applicable.
It is distinct, however, in that it is specifically centered on the notion of cognitive
narrative, taking into account human cognitive systems and aiming for a concept
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of narrative that appeals to the ideas and evidence of natural narrative rather than
former theoretical forms devised from the critical arts; it also is not motivated firstly
by functional or generative concerns, which are considered to be a side-effect or sub-
process of narrative cognition rather than the singular reason for it.
The theory for narrative cognition advanced in chapter 4 starts with perception,
and is suited to life-long, constant application and improvement in an agent. It sug-
gests that the perceptual process of event segmentation is a fundamental source of
narrative cognition, and that the events produced by the processes of EST are the
original cognitive building-blocks of narratives. Using the idea of graded narrativity,
bare events and early event segments will generally be poor narratives (i.e. exhibiting
relatively little narrativity, including little tellability or interest to an audience); this
is consistent with the development of narrative abilities observed in children, whose
early narratives are of limited coherence and relatively boring by more narratively-
experienced standards. While these early, individuated segments may perhaps be
considered as impoverished narratives, in principal narratives bear important distinc-
tions from their constituent events as produced by EST.
A first distinction of narratives from EST events is that events are considered
automatic and fundamental; event segmentation occurs as a process of perception,
automatically and continuously. While declarative knowledge structures have bear-
ing on the processes of event segmentation, particularly through event schemata and
event models, the bulk of event segmentation occurs without conscious supervision.
Applying, again, the notion of narrativity, it can be suggested that these event seg-
ments can become increasingly narrativized as they make more frequent use of in-
creasingly large narrative structures from memory; as they do so they will tend toward
composed narratives and away from exemplars of raw events. Archetypal cognitive
narratives, on the other hand, bear the distinction of being deliberate. This is sug-
gested by the prevalence of analytic decomposition throughout the dramatic, literary,
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and other fields, and also by the long-standing consideration of authoring processes,
which is by nature a process of mental effort. The literature on natural narratives
also reveals narrative-making to be a durational, sequential process, often interactive
and negotiated. Each of these bodies of research supports narrative-making as being
fundamentally deliberate, unlike event segmentation.
A second key distinction can be teased out by noting the different uses of the
declarative memory systems by EST; EST recognizes the crucial contributions of
semantic memory to the segmentation process, for example in the use of narrative
structures to parse information, but episodic memory is usually more the recipient
of the products of EST than a contributor to them. Nonetheless we regard episodic
memory as fundamental to narrative cognition, as the storage for narratives them-
selves (though research remains to determine how much, and what parts, of structured
narratives are actually stored anywhere) as well as the the primary source of events
(we may even say “episodes”) that will be manipulated by narrative cognition for
activities that include narrative generation. This differing use of the memory sys-
tems highlights the second property of cognitive narrative as distinct from events:
narrative is often the product of reflection spanning distances of time, rather than
nearly instantaneous as is perceptual event segmentation. This feature of cognitive
narrative exposes one of the major mechanisms of narrative cognition as opposed to
event segmentation: the use of narrative functions upon memory rather than upon
perception. While perception itself, and hence events, are hierarchical, this quality
is redoubled upon narrative because of the capability for deliberate composition and
reanalysis over [narrative] memories, even cyclically and recursively.
Our theory of narrative cognition is related to and reliant upon Event Segmenta-
tion, but bears the distinct differences we’ve reviewed: that narratives are deliberate,
and that narrative cognition need not (indeed, often is not) instantaneous but reflec-
tive, recursive, and analytic.
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5.2 Key Concepts
Three general definitions follow from this thesis theory for narrative cognition, which
may have impact upon larger bodies of narratology.
5.2.1 Cognitive Narrative
Cognitive narrative is narrative as a mental object, stored primarily in the episodic
memory system. It consists of events segmented into episodes. It is deliberately
created and exhibits hierarchicality, temporality and sequence, and malleability. It is
subject to and structured to be a resource for application of the functions of narrative
cognition. It is chiefly evaluated according to metrics of narrative quality.
The concept of cognitive narrative that arises from the theory of this thesis is
closely related to natural narrative, which is the personal narrative of everyday expe-
rience. We consider cognitive narrative to be the mental form of narrative that gives
rise to expressions of natural narrative and which is being modified and refined by the
discursive practices of personal narrative; bearing linguistic analogy, cognitive narra-
tive is to personal narrative (and surely some formal narrative) what deep structure
is to surface structure in linguistic syntactics–meaning, a hidden, inchoate structure
that is responsive to operations (re: narrative cognition) before being realized in a
recognizable surface form.
The concept of deep structures of narrative is as old as narratology and is most
clearly seen in Propp’s concept of fabula. However, the fabula was conceived by Propp
as an analytic tool, a means of describing narrative properties and organizing formal
study without making any claims as to cognitive plausibility or consideration of being
subject to systemic processes. The fabula represents the time-line and event-stream of
the story, subject to reorganization and filtering as the sjuzhet and text arise from it.
Cognitive narrative, on the other hand, is considered as part of the cognitive system
interacting with the functions and systems of the human cognitive architecture, which
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brings with it a host of implications with bearing on future work. It is recognized
as, itself, derived from experience or received narratives, rather than as an archetypal
progenitor created ex nihilo.
The theory proposed for the development of cognitive narrative within a long-
lived agent opens the door for further work exploring the structure and properties of
cognitive narrative. That said, some key properties are inherited from the roots in
perception and suggested by existing cognitivist approaches to narrative. One of the
most prominent is that of hierarchicality. Perception inherently incorporates multiple
levels of abstraction; this is likewise a trait of narrative, which magnifies this trait
because of its longitudinal, memory-based nature which allows hierarchicality and
recursion to be seen over greater spans than the short-term range of sensory percep-
tion. Where event hierarchicality and parse sequences of hand and object motion
into “catching” or “throwing,” cognitive narrative lends itself to broad categorization
as “tragedy” or “attempted murder,” or of being in service to a moral/theme, or on
to broader and broader structures up to national, theological, historical or cultural
meta-narratives.
5.2.2 Narrative Cognition
Narrative cognition is the process by which cognitive narratives are manipulated,
generated, and applied. From a functional perspective, any function which takes as
input a [cognitive] narrative or produces as output a [cognitive] narrative is a form of
narrative cognition (the “cognitive” nature of a narrative is implied by any narrative
which interacts with or passes through a mind). In the broadest sense we may define
narrative cognition as an extension of Newell’s definition of intelligence:
Intelligence: “The ability to bring to bear all the knowledge that one
has in the service of one’s goals.” [95, p. 90]
Narrative Cognition: The ability to apply narrative in the service of
75
intelligence.
Note that the definition of narrative cognition provided above has three implications
when seen through Newell’s definition of intelligence: narratives may be of use in
“bringing to bear,” particularly organizing and arranging knowledge; they may be of
use in contributing to “the knowledge one has,” particularly when used to understand
the world or the actions of individuals and to update beliefs; and they may focused
on “one’s goals” in a number of ways including for goal reasoning (selecting/changing
of goals) or for the application of narrative functions.
The means by which cognitive narratives undergo application is surely broad and
remains to be explored across the range of domains, and this thesis has been chiefly
concerned with only the function of narrative generation from experience; nonetheless,
we can enumerate a number of functions suggested by the literature, many provided
by Herman [50]:
• Narrative generation from experience.
• Narrative comprehension.
• Storytelling, which will require a host of functions of its own.
• Analogy, a process by no means singular to narrative, but certainly of first-order
concern to it.
• Imputing causality.
• Typifying phenomena (which probably shares process with narrative analogy).




Crucial to our discussion of cognitive narrative is a means of evaluation that can
also guide function of narrative cognition. To this end we enlist Walter Fisher’s
concept of narrative rationality, which is echoed in concepts of narrative evaluation
in narrative generation, and which we believe applies to cognition: that cognitive
narrative is principally evaluated with respect to coherence and fidelity ; in other
words, with intra-story and inter-story parsimony of the narrative, where inter-story
is understood to pertain to life-stories and experiential narratives, in particular (e.g.
for a religious individual, is the story compatible with the qualities they attribute to
an over-ruling god and the rules they ascribe to His world?).
We assert that coherence and fidelity are the significant dimensions for measure-
ment of narrative quality, but we do not at this time encroach on future researcher’s
explorations as to the best means of measuring these dimensions or evaluating the
trade-off between the two, which has been a question in flux throughout the history
of storytelling. To make a broad simplification, the more ancient the narrative the
more fidelity was valued over coherence, such that animals magic could make ends
meet and characters or gods could act irrationally so long as an appeal to a supposed
real-world principle or observation was produced, so that thunder was god-made and
tragedies were cautionary. Today, on the other hand, the ability to escape ever-more
completely into a fantasy narrative with a consistent world and believable characters
is highly valued.
5.3 Scope, Limitations, and Future Work
This thesis explores an initial theory of narrative cognition as phenomenological,
event-based, and originally perceptually derived. However, such an undertaking is
necessarily preliminary. While it is hoped that this theory provides a firm foundation
for future work, such future work is critically needed.
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Of first concern is scope. This theory proposes perceptual events as the atomic unit
of narrative, or as the seed from which narratives arise. This establishes the smallest
possible scope for a narrative while admitting the role for coarser-granularity inputs
that have yet to be clearly defined. Such inputs may effect narrative cognition in two
places: at the event-perception level narrative structures that include such things
as culture, emotions, and identity can provide event schemata that effect the event
models used to form events. At the reflective, memory-oriented level these inputs will
play a similar role over a wider and larger range of narratives. Future research on the
role of culture, for example, upon narratives and cognition can find theoretical utility
by exploration through this theory.
Related to the issue of differing scopes of inputs, work remains for methods of
working with different scopes of narratives themselves; as the size of episodic memory
grows, how shall narratives be constructed from this memory base? What shall be
the boundaries of generated narratives, and when shall small/short narratives be
preferred to large/long narratives? This issue is unfamiliar to work on semantic
memory, which is isolated by nature, but narrative may be infinitely composable,
therefore requiring practical boundaries upon narrative recursion and composition.
In addition to insights from computational theory, there are likely insights to be had
from cognitive science upon the stopping-points for reflective narrative generation.
The theory in chapter 4 includes a pair of general heuristics designed to make pre-
dictions possible at all times. The rules that allow prediction are a point of further
study that is of importance to all of event segmentation, with potential for special
rules that work in narrative cognition. Both general rules and domain-specific rules
need to be refined. Of particular importance is the development of theories to ac-
count for the learning and improving of predictive ability; this is particularly relevant
to narrative cognition as typification and expectation are among the functions of
narrative cognition mentioned above.
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A final point of primary importance for future work is the development of the nar-
rative cognition functions laid out in section 5.2.2. For applications in information
analysis or learning systems, most important may be functions for narrative compre-
hension by which a cognitive system is able to meaningfully process inputs other than
first-hand experiential information. For applications in games, entertainment, and ex-
pressive AI, storytelling functions by which the narrative base is variably transformed
and communicated will be of top priority. Finally, while all of these will have import
and shed insight on human cognition, work on functions for analogy (a fundamen-
tal function of general intelligence) and distributing intelligence will be particularly
relevant to the ways in which narrative cognition can guide education initiatives.
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